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ABSTRACT 
Type III exits are a useful means of escape and they exist on a large proportion of the 
airline fleet. Evidence from aircraft accidents and previous research indicates that 
many passengers experience great difficulty in operating and evacuating through an 
overwing exit. There are two different approaches to improving passenger operating 
performance; these being improvement and simplification of the task itself or 
provision of clear instruction or practice for the passenger seated next to the exit. 
The first experiment investigated the impact of improvement to the Type III exit 
mechanism and practice on participant operation speed and accuracy. The results of a 
four-way Analysis of Variance indicated that both speed and accuracy of operation 
improved as a result of the exit redesign. A Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance 
also showed that the provision of practice led to a significant reduction in operation 
times. However, practising the operation of the current design of the Type III exit 
failed to improve participant speed of operation to the level achieved by participants 
when operating the modified exit for the first time. 
The results from the second study which investigated the impact of variations in 
safety briefings on participants' speed and accuracy of operation of the traditional 
Type III exit clearly indicated the benefits of providing some form of instruction. 
Allowing participants to watch a `fellow passenger' on a video performing the task led 
to quicker and more accurate exit operation. Variations in pre-flight briefing card 
design were also shown to improve operation accuracy. 
The implications of these results for the future development of self help exits, 
provision of training and design of briefing material are discussed. 
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1 INTRODUCTION TO THESIS 
In an emergency, the main exits of a civil aircraft are normally expected to be 
operated by a member of the cabin crew. The Type III exits, which are smaller and 
usually located over the aircraft wing, must be opened by passengers. 
The objective of this thesis was to investigate the human factors associated with the 
operation of the Type III Exit. The difficulties which passengers encounter when 
trying to operate such exits have been well documented and the aim of the two 
experimental studies was to investigate methods of improving passengers ability- to 
operate these exits in a timely and correct manner. 
The introduction to the thesis begins with a review of factors influencing passengers 
performance of safety procedures and the specific difficulties encountered with the 
Type III Exit. In the following chapters the methods which may be used to improve 
passenger operation of the Type III exit by either improving the operator through 
better instruction and practice or improving the design of the equipment so that it is 
easier for the operator to use are considered. Each of the experiments are reported in 
separate chapters including a discussion of the results. The final chapter of the thesis 
provides conclusions from the research programme and recommendations for further 
research are discussed. 
2 FACTORS INFLUENCING SURVIVAL 
Over the last three decades, air travel has become an increasingly popular means of 
transportation. A large proportion of the population of the United Kingdom now 
assume that their primary mode of transport to reach their holiday destination will be 
by aircraft. The market for business travel is one of the major growth areas for 
airlines, becoming increasingly competitive. Whilst air travel is considered to be 
relatively safe, unfortunately accidents do occur. In 1997 the world-wide fleet of 
commercial airliners were involved in 152 accidents of which 51 were classified as 
survivable (Flight International, 21 January, 1998). 
The aviation industry has made remarkable progress in reducing the rate of aircraft 
accidents. Statistics quoted by Hart (1996), indicate that had accident rates not 
improved since 1960, due to the volumes of flights today, the industry would suffer 
more than 10,000 fatalities a year world-wide. He goes further to suggest that due to 
this dramatic decline in accident rates, the industry actually suffers on average less 
than 800 fatalities. This figure relates to accidents involving aircraft from the 
worldwide commercial jet fleet and is supported by data presented by Russell (1996). 
Whilst primary safety has dramatically improved over the last few decades with 
measures being taken to prevent major accidents occurring, the statistics would seem 
to indicate that secondary measures which are introduced to protect the public in the 
event of an accident occurring, have not led to a similar reduction in the fatality rate 
on board survivable aircraft (Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 1989; Taylor, 1996). 
For this reason not only the issues concerned with the prevention of the occurrence of 
accidents, but also issues related to improving survival rates in the event of an 
accident, will be of major importance in the years to come. 
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2.1 Accident classification 
Accidents may be classified into three categories; 'non survivable', `survivable', and 
'technically survivable'. Accidents are classified as non survivable when crash forces 
for example are so severe that none of the passengers or crew survive (for example 
Pan Am 747 in 1988 at Lockerbie). Survivable accidents, are those accidents when all 
of the passengers and crew survive (for example KAL Airbus A-300,1994). 
Technically survivable accidents, include those where some of the passengers or crew 
survive. This grouping includes accidents such as the British Airtours Boeing 737 at 
Manchester, 1985. 
In the majority of accidents the deceleration forces imposed on the aircraft occupants 
and their immediate environment during the crash sequence, are such that the 
passengers are not exposed to unacceptable `g' tolerances. On such occasions, an 
emergency evacuation maybe instigated by the cabin crew with the aim to facilitate 
the rapid movement of passengers from a potentially hazardous environment to the 
outside world. The success of such rapid evacuation of those on board is dependent 
upon a number of extrinsic factors. These include the number and location of exits; 
any help received from crew and other passengers; whether any exits are blocked by 
fire or smoke and if all available exits have been operated. Survival may also depend 
upon intrinsic factors, those attributes which are held by individual passengers. The 
physical and mental attributes held by each individual may facilitate an individual's 
evacuation in the short time available; conversely these may also hinder the 
individual. 
2.2 Factors Influencing Evacuation Success 
The Probability of survival in a survivable aircraft accident depends on several 
factors. These can be broadly categorised into four groups: Configurational; 
Procedural; Environmental; and Behavioural (Snow, Carrole and Allgood, 1970). 
These are shown in Figure 1 with a brief description of each of the factors. 
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Figure 1. Some Factors Influencing Survival in Emergency Evacuations 
(Amended from Snow et al, 1970). 
Description Examples 
Configurational Standard features of the Seatim, density, aisle \k idth, 
occupant environment size, number and location of 
controlling access to exits exits, slides, physical exit 
and evacuation flow rates cues 
Procedural Regulatory and training of Experience and training of 
crew and other non- crew. 
passenger rescue personnel 
which influence evacuation 
procedures 
Environmental Features of the occupant Heat and toxic by-products 
space and outside the aircraft of combustion, secondary 
which control the evacuation explosion, outside light and 
time weather 
Behavioural Psychological, biological and Sex, age, knowledge and 
cultural attributes of physical condition of 
individual passengers which passengers 
influence agility and 
behaviour 
Included among these factors, is the passenger's knowledge of the emergency 
evacuation equipment, procedures and the location of exits. It has become apparent 
from aircraft accident investigations, that passengers' behaviour and ability to operate 
emergency equipment and procedures are important survival factors. Barthelmess 
(1984) suggested that pre-planning and safety knowledge were the most important 
factors in the survival of those onboard the DC9 at Cincinatti (June 1983). 
Research and development of mandatory requirements by the aviation authorities has 
to date concentrated primarily on the configurational and procedural factors. The 
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aims of which have been to improve and maintain air safety and aid passenger egress 
during emergency situations. In order to ensure that emergency evacuations are as 
expeditious as possible the timely operation of all exits which are available is 
imperative. In most instances crew members will be stationed next to the main 
aircraft exits, however on many types of aircraft passengers without the assistance of 
crew members, will be required to operate self help exits such as Type III and IV 
exits. 
2.3 Type III Exits 
Type III exits are used on a large range of sizes and types of civil aircraft. There are 
currently 532 aircraft registered in the United Kingdom aircraft fleet with Type III 
exits (JAP World Airline fleets, 1998). Type III exits differ from airframe main doors 
by not being supported or having their motion constrained by a mechanism. The 
dimensions of these exits and restrictions are given in Figure 2 and a simplified 
representation of their operation is shown in Figure 3. Figure 3 is one example of a 
Type III exit operation diagram, others will be considered in Chapter 7. 
B (min) 508 mm (20 in) 
H (min) 915 mm (36 in) 
R (max) %B 
h, (max) 508 mm (20 in) 
h2 (max) 686 mm (27 in) 
Figure 2: Type III exit dimensions 
J 
Figure 3: Type III exit operation 
Once released from the aperture, the mass of the hatch must be supported by the 
operator who should then rotate the exit and jettison it through the opening. This 
method of operation has a number of possible disadvantages in an emergency 
situation. Firstly the hatch can be very heavy weighing up to ')0.4kg (67 lbs) on some z::, 
A320's (Appendix A provides details on aircraft specific Type III exit hatch weights). 
Added to this there is limited space between seats and other obstructions, contrary to 
the impression given by Figure 3. The situation is potentially made worse, for the 
operator of the exit, by passengers crowding into the space available, in their attempt 
to rapidly escape through the opening. Finally, the design of the exit is not common 
in everyday life, unlike most exits and doors passengers encounter on a daily basis, 
the exit is not hinged and does not open outwards. As Johnson (1984) observed the 
operator is usually a passenger, not a member of the cabin crew, as would normally be 
the case for larger exits, and has not had the benefit of training prior to boarding the 
aircraft. 
The evidence from aircraft accidents indicates that many passengers were unfamiliar 
with the method of operation of the Type III overwing exit and as a consequence 
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experienced great difficulty operating a Type III exit and evacuating through the exit 
onto the wing. For example in the accidents which occurred at King Salmon, Alaska 
in 1982 and Manchester in 1985, passengers seated adjacent to these exits were 
confused and unclear about the method of operation. In Alaska the over-wing exit did 
not become operational until the passengers were assisted by the Aircraft Cornmander. 
At Manchester a passenger initially attempted to operate the exit by using the armrest 
on the hatch, subsequently the person sat next to her operated the release handle 
trapping the person seated adjacent to the exit under the exit hatch. The man behind 
her had to then remove the hatch and place it on a seat in his row. These dela-vs led to 
the exit not being fully operational until 45 seconds after the aircraft came to a halt. 
CAP 360, part 1, Chapter 6 page 6/19 Paragraph 3.1 requires that for Type III exit seat 
rows 'the seats which form the access route from the cabin aisle to the exit are only to 
allocated to passengers who appear capable of operating and/or assisting with the 
operation of the exit'. According to this requirement, passengers may not occupy 
these seats if they are handicapped, children or infants, frail, elderly or obese, 
deportees or prisoners in custody, as they may in an emergency evacuation cause a 
delay or obstruction. Unfortunately, these requirements do not guarantee the speedy 
operation of these exits, passengers may fail to make the exit available quickly due to 
incapacitation from physical injuries or as a result of psychological trauma. 
Despite passenger difficulties in operation of these type of exits are still an important 
means of escape particularly as accident data shows that exits in the middle of an 
aircraft tend to be more usable than exits at either end (Chandler, George and Pollard, 
1987). Figure 4 indicates the important role these type of exits can have in an 
emrgency exit. 
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Figure 4: Number of Type III exits opened and used for evacuation, by 
passengers in thirteen emergencies during the period 1970-1980* 
Aircraft accidents 
123456789 10 11 12 13 
No. of exits opened 1213414222322 
by passengers 
No. of passengers 31 ?1? 11 9?? 46 ?? 12 8 
using exit(s) 
Source: Data from Johnson, 1984. 
* These data do not represent all the aircraft accidents that occured in the period 1970-1980. 
2.4 Mandatory action 
In the accident which occurred at Manchester Airport in the UK in 1985 the 
evacuation of passengers was impeded by blockages at the Type III exit and at the 
aperture between the bulkheads at the front of the cabin. At the time, the 
configuration of the seat row which forms the access to the overwing exit was not 
required by the CAA to have any specific dimensions. The only constraint at the time 
was that the location of the seats relative to the exit did not cause any obstruction in 
the opening of the exit itself (FARJJAR 25, part . 813). As a result of the accident at 
Manchester, in 1986 the CAA introduced minimum standard requirements for seating 
configurations and exit operating instructions, in order to improve the opening and 
access to the Type III exits. The Airworthiness notice No. 79 1989 (AN79,1989) 
defined two new alternative seating arrangements which the CAA believed would 
make the opening of the exit easier: 
`Where all forward facing or all aft facing seats are arranged such that there is 
a single access route between seat rows from the aisle to a Type III exit, the 
access shall be of sufficient width and be located fore and aft so that no part of 
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any seat which is beneath the exit extends beyond the exit centre line and the 
access width between seat rows vertically projected, shall not be less than half 
the exit hatch width including any trim, or 10 inches, whichever is greater. ' 
and 
`Seats may only be located beyond the centre line of a Type III exit provided 
there is space immediately adjacent to the exit which projects inboard from the 
exit a distance no less than the width of a passenger seat and the seats are so 
arranged as to provide two access routes between seat rows from the cabin 
aisle to the exit'. 
In addition to changes to the seating configuration the AN 79 1989 (paragraph 2.5) 
required Type III operating instructions, comparable to those on the Cabin Safety 
Leaflet to be displayed on the back of the seats, on the seat row immediately forward 
of the exits. 
2.5 Research Into Passenger Access And Operation Of Type III Exits 
The Manchester air disaster in 1985 thus precipitated a considerable amount of 
research into the conditions in which passengers are best able to evacuate an aircraft 
through its overwing exits. Much of this research has been conducted in order to 
determine whether the configurational changes outlined in AN79 have actually had 
any impact on passenger access to and opening of the Type III exits. 
Early research conducted by Rasmussen and Chittum (1986), investigated 
configurational changes adjacent to emergency exits. They found that by increasing 
the seat pitch, or removing the outboard seat adjacent to an ovenving exit. the rate of 
egress could be significantly increased. This research however, was conducted "'ý-ith 
passengers evacuating in a rapid and orderly manner in conditions similar to those in 
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the airworthiness certification tests, and therefore it could be argued that no account 
was taken of the situation when passengers are all pushing to try and get out of the 
exit at the same time. 
Muir and Marrison (1989) conducted a programme of research into passeliger 
behaviour in aircraft emergency evacuations. In order to increase the individual 
motivation of volunteers to evacuate rapidly from a stationary aircraft, bonus 
payments were introduced. Their study investigated the influence of several seating 
configurations of the seat rows which form the access to the Tý'pe III exit, including 
the two alternate minimum seating requirements specified in AN 79 and the seating. 
configuration prior to 1986. The research indicated that evacuation rates through the 
overwing exit were significantly faster for the seating configurations specified in AN 
79, as compared to that prior to 1986. However when the outboard seatwas removed, 
two escape routes were available, one along the rows bounding the exit and one by 
means of the row to the aft of the exit. This led to a situation in which double the 
number of people had access to the Type III exit at one time, leading at some points, 
to a complete blockage. This congestion led on two occasions to the evacuation being 
halted before all of the volunteers had escaped and as a result this configuration 
should be treated with caution. 
During each of the evacuations a member of the research team operated the Type III 
exit in order to remove any interaction between the method of opening the exit and the 
seat configuration on egress rate. As a result of this methodology, the study did not 
provide an insight into the difficulties that untrained personnel might encounter when 
attempting to operate such an exit. Interestingly the trained individuals who operated 
the exit during this research programme reported that some seating configurations 
made the task of opening the exit more difficult than others. The highest rating of 
difficulty was given to the outboard seat removed seating configuration follo"ved 
closely by the Pre AN79 seating configuration. This result suggests that ease of exit 
operation is in fact a facet of the success of an emergency evacuation. 
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More recent work carried out by Fennell & Muir (199-33) investigating the influence of 
hatch weight and seating configuration on the operation of a Type III exit, illustrated 
the difficulties that members of the public can experience when operating this type of 
exit. Indeed some participants in this experiment took over 50 seconds to operate the 
exit and evacuate onto the wing. This research also highlighted the difficulty some 
passengers experience with the correct disposal of the exit (many participants left it 
inside the aircraft, thus causing an obstruction). The authors suggested that the 
problems experienced by the volunteers during the tests indicated that the Type III 
exit hatch operating instructions illustrated on safety cards were ambiguous to some 
passengers. The result of this ambiguity was to slow down exit operation and cause 
indecision about exit disposal. The study however failed to make any suggestions 
about how the exit operation diagrams could be improved in such a v'uy any 
ambiguity could be removed. It also failed to suggest any possible alternatives to 
instruction format or delivery that may aid and/or improve passengers ability to 
operate such exits. 
The results from this test programme did however clearly indicate the benefit which 
could be gained from a reduction to the weight of the hatch from 25kg to 12.5kg on 
the time taken to operate the exit hatch. Reductions of this degree have proved 
difficult on large transport aircraft although there have been some redesigns e. g. 
Boeing 737 exit hatch mass has been reduced to 17kg, A320 exit hatch mass has been 
reduced to 14.5 kg. However in Fennel and Muir's study such a reduction in weight 
did not lead to a significant reduction in exit operation times. 
Research to date has successfully highlighted methods to improve passengers egress 
to and through the Type III exit. The programme of work carried out by Muir and 
Marrison (1989) showed that configurational changes to seating in this area detailed in 
AN79 (1989), could significantly increase passengers speed of egress. This research 
also indicated that ease of exit operation is in fact a facet of the success of an 
emergency evacuation. Whilst the reduction in weight of these exits has been shown 
to significantly aid the operator, in reality these improvements have been difficult to 
achieve to date. This study also indicated that many participants were failing to 
comprehend the operating instructions finding the diagrams ambiguous and unclear. 
In order to insure that in the event of an emergency, exits operated by untrained 
passengers are made available as quickly and correctly as possible further research is 
required. 
2.6 Passenger Behaviour And Reactions To Life Threatening Situations 
When assessing possible changes to equipment or procedures to be used by 
passengers, it is imperative that the way in which passengers may behaN-e in an 
emergency be considered. It is well known that in some aircraft accidents everyone 
files out of the aircraft in an orderly manner, for example in the evacuation of the 
British Airways Boeing 747 at Los Angeles in 1987 as a result of a bomb scare. 
However, in other accidents, the orderly process breaks down and confusion in the 
cabin can lead to blockages in the aisles and at exits resulting in loss of life. 
With comprehensive understanding of behaviour in highly stressful and disorientating 
conditions steps can be taken to improve the probability of increasing passenger 
accuracy and speed when performing safety procedures. 
Behavioural responses of survivors to aircraft accidents can be gathered from tv, -o 
sources. Firstly via survivors' accounts and accident reports and secondly from 
experimental work. Until recently very few accounts of passenger behaviour have 
been published and conducting truly realistic experiments has been limited due to the 
ethical constraints imposed on such work. As a result of these constraints infon-nation 
has been supplemented from a variety of emergency situations and natural disasters. 
While the inclusion of such data has proved essential it is important to keep in mind 
the uniqueness of the aircraft accident. This uniqueness is apparent when one 
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considers the five factors, proposed by Robson (1973), constituting differences 
between passengers in an aircraft accident and other high stress situations. 
Figure 5: Factors contributing to the uniqueness of the situation in an 
aircraft cabin 
1. The passengers form a fairly large amorphous group, with no fixed hierarchy'. 
2. The passengers have usually never met before 
3. The passengers are in what to the majority of them is a strange environment. 
4. The cabin is a cramped environment. 
5. There are essentially only two levels of group structure in the cabin - the crew and 
passengers. 
(Taken from Robson, 1973) 
In an aircraft situation all five factors apply, however in other settings only some may 
be present. Robson (1973) provides several examples to highlight this point, for 
example in a mine disaster only factor four is applicable however in a theatre fire 
factors one, two and five are applicable. Despite the limitations of information from 
such sources its inclusion supplements the available information from aircraft 
accidents allowing a more in depth picture to be constructed relating to the types of 
behaviours exhibited by passengers particularly in smoked filled environments. 
There are many different ways in which individual passengers respond to an 
emergency situation. These may be influenced by their familiarity with the 
environment, the time available for preparation, the perceived time available for 
escape, whether they are alone or accompanied, their previous experiences, the type of 
emergency and demographic characteristics. 
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2.6.1 Flight/Flight Response 
Fear, is the dominant emotion when survival is threatened and underlies all the 
behavioural responses to an aircraft emergency. Lazarus (1966) purported that once a 
threat is perceived a person may react in three ways: 'strengthen his resources', 
'flight' from the area, in ot her words escape, or 'fight' i. e. attack the agent of harm, 
perhaps a cabin fire in this instance and finally an individual may remain inactive and 
'do nothing'. 
The degree and magnitude of the Right/flight response is strongly linked to the degree 
of perceived threat. Flight may in the case of a small fire involve evacuating a 
specific part of the cabin; however, should the perceived threat be greater, this may 
lead to individuals even trying to evacuate before the aircraft has come to a stand still 
and against the advice of cabin crew as in the case of the aircraft accident quoted by 
LeRoy (1967). 
2.6.2 Anxiety 
In an emergency situation which is potentially life threatening and anxiety provoking, 
passengers are expected to make a series of novel and difficult responses. In view of 
the relationship now known to exist between individuals' ability to perform and their 
level of anxiety, it is no wonder that an individuals ability to carry out the required 
actions and safety tasks does not reach its optimum level (see Figure 6). 
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Figure 6: The relationship between levels of anxiety and performance for 
both simple and difficult tasks 
(Yerkes-Dobson Law, 1906) 
Good 
Performance 
Simple 
Tasks 
Difficult 
Poor Tasks 
Performance 
Low Anxiety Moderate Anxiety High Anxiety 
As Figure 6 demonstrates, during levels of high stress interference with memory and 
learning processes reduces ones ability to perform even the most simple tasks. This 
suggests that the information in the pre-flight safety briefing and on the safety card 
may not be well remembered, Similarly, safety demonstrations given to passengers 
shortly before an anticipated emergency may not be fully comprehended. An 
individual in an emergency situation has to quickly respond to the cues he receives. 
This response will also be affected by how familiar the behavioural response is to that 
particular situation (Becker, 1973). It has been shown that passengers ability to 
perform simple tasks such as the operation of an oxygen mask and seat belt can be 
detrimentally effected by high levels of stress (Johnson, 1984). A useful theory for 
understanding and predicting the performance of passengers in emergencies is the 
'habit hierarchy' (Spence, 1960). When a person experiences fear they are more 
likely to display a habit that is high in their hierarchy. An action ýxill be high in the 
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hierarchy if it has been well practised and has become 'overlearned'. As a result an 
individual is more likely to perform a more familiar response in a highlý' stressful 
situation; this is known as affiliative behaviour. For example, maný- passengers, 
revert to operating the aircraft lap belts as one would an ordinary car seat belt. If 
passengers are familiar with safety procedures then these actions will be high in the C) 
habit hierarchy and more likely to be exhibited in an emergency. 
2.6.3 Affiliative behaviour 
Research by Sime (1985, a) has suggested that behaviour of people trying to escape 
building fires is characterised by movement towards the familiar. In other words, that 
the direction of movement will be related to not only the location of the threat but, 
also the location and degree of familiarity of the individual with attachment objects 
(i. e. person and place affiliation). This escape behaviour has been observed in both 
emergency evacuations from buildings and aircraft as individuals try to escape 
through the doors through which they had entered the building or boarded the aircraft 
often by-passing useable alternative exits (Sime, 1985, b and Marrison and Muir, 
1989). Recent research (Galea, 1998) has suggested that such behaviour is not as 
common as first thought, in fact the majority of passengers do indeed use their nearest 
exit. 
2.6.4 Depersonalisation 
Individuals involved in life threatening events often recount feelings of time slowing 
coupled with an increased mental activity (Noyes and Kletti, 1977). Such feelings of 
detachment appear to occur instantly as the individual realises they are in extreme 
danger and disappear when the threat is past. Individuals become 'observers' of the 
situation, detaching themselves from reality. By doing this it seems to allow them to 
be able to think and respond more effectively. 
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2.6.5 Panic 
Panic may be defined as uncontrollable and irrational behaviour. The behaviour is 
characterised by self-preservation at all costs and irrational animalistic behaviour, 
involving the breakdown of group ties (i. e. 'non-social" behaviour: ignoring of group 
members; or 'asocial' behaviour: kicking, trampling) (Sime, 1985). 
Panic only arises when something which is highly valued is threatened and when there 
is no obvious relenting by the threat (Cantril, 1958; Quarentelli, 1954). Interestin-, -, I--,,, 
Quarentelli noted that there appears to be little evidence of panic occurring when 
people have been trapped with no possibility of escape. 
Sime (1993) highlights how 'panic' can be seen as a description of behaviour that 
occurs in disasters, created and used by the media to add 'spice' to disaster reports. 
The two examples below show how the same crowd behaviour may be interpreted 
very differently. 
"Panic in an assembly audience results in a crowd jamming the exits and 
causing injuries quite apart from injury by fire. In the type of building 
now being considered, individuals as well as groups may become panic- 
stricken. Lives may be lost, for example through fear of using staircases 
in which there is smoke but which would actually give safe passage out 
of a building" (The ministry of Works, 1952 cited in Sime, 1993). 
The same pattern of behaviour is interpreted somewhat differently below. 
"When people, attempting to escape from a burning building pile up at a 
single exit, their behaviour appears highly irrational to someone , N, ho 
learns after the panic that other exits were available. To the actor in the 
situation who does not recognise the existence of these alternatives, 
attempting to fight his way to the exit available may seem a verý, logical 
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choice as opposed to burning to death". (Turner and Killian, 1957 cited in 
Sime, 1993). 
The second quote suggests that behaviour which may be seen as 'Irrational' in respect 
to others, is in fact 'rational' from the perspective of those involved in the incident. It 
is suggested that the intentions and resultant behaviour of the individuals are in fact 
well thought out given the information available to them at the given time (Breaux. 
Canter and Sime, 1976; Turner and Killan, 1957). 
Whilst panic is often considered to be the most typical or expected response to an 
emergency the actual incidence of such behaviour is actually quite rare (Quarentelli 
1954 , Fritz and Marks 1954, Innes 1975, Marrison and Muir, 1989). As Robson 
(1973) showed in his study following a emergency warning cabin crew members 
reported that only approximately I% of individuals demonstrated panic behaviour. 
2.6.6 Behavioural Inaction 
Behavioural inaction is classified as a stunned and bewildered response to a disaster 
situation, a pattern of response described by Johnson (1984), as 'negative panic'. 
Individuals behave as if they are dazed or immobile, behaviour which is totally 
inappropriate in an aircraft emergency, especially when fire and smoke is present in 
the cabin and typically individuals have less than two minutes when conditions are 
survivable in the cabin. 
Allerton (1964), in his behavioural analysis of four disasters reported that 10 to 25% 
of people behaved in a "confused, anxiety-ridden, somewhat immobile manner". 
Evidence from aircraft accidents suggests that this mode of behaviour is more likeiv to 
occur than panic. Survivors of the accident at Tenerife in 1977, when two Boeing 
747s collided claimed to have witnessed fellow passengers remaining in their seats 
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while others did little to escape from the burning aircraft. Other survivors of this 
incident also stated that they had experienced this phenomenon but overcame it, by 
commanding themselves or being ordered by others to escape (Johnson, 1984). 
Equally, two fatalities of the DC-9 at Cincinnati (198j), were found sitting with their 
seat belts fastened, although both were sitting at a considerable distance from the 
source of the smoke and toxic fumes. Such individuals must have remained inactiVe 
until the fire and smoke overcame them. 
Such a response to an aircraft accident is not surprising, passengers are expected to 
perform tasks which are novel and often complex. Such tasks include the location and 
operation of emergency exits, in an environment which may be physically threatening 
and confusing, due to smoke, fire, damage to the fuselage and the behaviour of fellow 
passengers. 
Lazarus (1966) defines two cognitive states which are thought to manifest themselves 
in a behavioural response of inaction. The first state is that of a conflict of impulses. 
In the situation where an individual perceives a threat to their life the natural response 
is one of avoidance and immediate escape. However , such behaviour may be 
inhibited as a result of certain situational constraints equalling or exceeding the 
strength of the original threat. 
The second state is that of no action impulse. Lazarus suggests that one of three 
conditions will lead to an individual taking no action after a threat has been identified. 
The first condition is where the individual is resigned to the conclusion that there is no 
way of preventing hann. The second condition resulting in an individual taking no 
action occurs when as a defence mechanism an incorrect reappraisal of the situation 
causes the individual to conclude that no danger exists. The final condition and 
possibly the most plausible explanation for behavioural inaction is that as a result of 
high stress the individual is uncertain of the correct response or action he/she should 
take. 
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2.6.7 Strategic or planned behaviour 
Some behaviours observed in an emergency are not negative. There is considerable 
evidence to suggest that many individuals are capable of planning an appropriate 
strategy prior to an emergency and are able to retain their cognitive abilities in order 
to implement their chosen strategy (Barthelmess, 1984). Evidence from accidents 
suggests that those individuals who are well informed and mentally plan a strategy for 
escape have a greater chance of survival (Barthelmess, 1984; Johnson, 1984). 
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In the emergency at Cincinnati involving an in-flight fire (1983) cabin crevý- instructed 
five passengers in emergency procedures prior to landing. These five passengers %, ýýCre 
instructed to move towards specific exits as quickly as possible, open them and get 
out (Barthelmess, 1984). Four of these five passengers survived and all the crew 
compared with only 18 out of 41 of the remaining passengers. Barthelmess suggested 
that passengers given specific evacuation instructions had a 'mental game plan' or 
strategy. 
2.6.8 Evaluation of the classification of behaviour 
The evidence presented suggests that people can behave in a variety of ways when 
placed in a highly stressful and possibly life threatening situation. The idea that all 
people panic and behave in an irrational manner is a misplaced notion. An individuals 
response will be a reflection of the knowledge of the physical environment and his/her 
perception of the circumstances in which he/she finds him/herself. As a result there 
are variety of behavioural responses that may be seen within one emergency. 
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2.7 Methods of reducing passenger maladaptive behaviour and increasing the 
occurrence of adaptive behaviours. 
It has become apparent that stress is a major influence on behaviour, and may 
adversely affect passenger performance of novel or complex safety procedures. 
Research by McDonnell Douglas (1977) proposed three methods by 'Vý, hich 
maladaptive behaviours, such as behavioural inaction can be overcome increasing the 
chances that passengers correctly perform safety procedures. These are trial and error, 
training or instruction and crew member situation leadership. 
An example of trial and error would be repeated attempts by a naive passenger to 
activate the flow of oxygen to their mask until they succeed. Such a strategy is the 
least effective method of overcoming maladaptive behaviours and not appropriate 
when time-critical responses are necessary. Unfortunately it is still the most 
frequently employed strategy. In light of this evidence in order to reduce the impact 
of high stress and optimise passenger performance when using such a strategy it is 
imperative that safety procedures are as simple as possible. 
The likelihood of passengers eliciting maladaptive behaviours can be reduced by 
providing passengers with information about what to do in an emergency. The 
information might be given prior to aircraft departure. This strategy relies on 
passengers paying attention and retaining the information which is not always the 
case. Alternatively, the information might be delivered when an emergency is 
imminent although in the majority of accidents reviewed between the years of 1959 
and 1985 only in 15% of cases was there time for cabin staff to inform the passengers 
of the imminent danger (Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, 1986). If 
passengers are to utilise infon-nation given to them during an emergency it must be 
clear and unambiguous enabling passengers to make rational and informed decisions 
about the appropriate course of action. If information ý, ý'as ambiguous this -, xould 
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serve to -increase passengers' already high stress levels reducing their abilitv to 
comprehend and carry out instructions effectively. 
Providing passengers with training can increase the probability that safety infon-nation 
will, first be attended to and, secondly, carried out quickly and correctlý-- Pronko and 
Leith (1956) demonstrated that, when confronted by a confusing environment and the 
threat of physical harm for incorrect actions, participants who had practised the task 
performed best. Receiving leadership throughout the test was also of some benefit. 
Participants who received neither practice nor leadership, were the only experimental 
condition to exhibit behavioural inaction. 
The third method of strong leadership can overcome behavioural inaction and prevent 
panic. Assigning passengers with roles and responsibilities can reduce the incidence 
of panic. For example, a passenger could be instructed to operate the Type III exit and 
others asked to take responsibility for the welfare of less able bodied passengers. 
Douglas found that crew member leadership combined with passenger information is 
more effective than either of the two methods alone. 
2.8 Approaches to solving Type III exit operation problems 
In the case of operational difficulties of the Type III exit there are two different 
approaches to minimising maladaptive behaviours whilst optimising passengers 
ability to operate the Type III exit in a timely and accurate manner. These are either 
"fitting the person to the task" or "fitting the task to the person". In this instance the 
provision of safety information and training is concerned with the former and human 
centred design of equipment is concerned with the latter. Each of these will be dealt 
with in turn in two separate chapters. 
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3 DESIGNING THE TASK FOR THE MAN 
3.1 Biomechanic Considerations 
In general, biornechanics determines what a person can physically do. Research in the 
area of lifting tasks and manual handling of heavy loads invariably deals vvith 
repetitive tasks in the workplace suggesting acceptable weights and methods of 
reducing work related injuries. 
Auyob et al. (1987) quote the Information sheet published by the International Labor 
Organization which stated limits for occasional lifting as Table I shows the maximum 
acceptable weight for men aged between 20 - 35 is less than many of the designs of 
Type III exits. Other guidelines such as the National Institute for Occupational Safety 
and Health (NIOSH, 198 1) and job severity index (JSI) (Ayoub et al. 1978) can be 
used to establish acceptable lifting recommendations. 
Table 1 Individual capacity of lift (kilograms) 
Age (years) Men Women 
14-16 14.6 9.8 
16-18 18.5 11.7 
18-20 22.6 13.6 
20-35 24.5 14.6 
35-50 20.6 12.7 
Over 50 15.6 9.8 
As table one indicates strength tends to increase until about thirty years of age; then it 
levels off in middle age and decreases with old age (Hafez et al., 1982). However, the 
amount of decrease with age can be reduced by regular exercise. On average the 
strength of women is about two-thirds that of men. Suggesting that women should 
find more difficulty in the operation of the Type III exit. 
23 
The current method of Type III exit operation requires the operator to make unusual 
twisting movements to manoeuvre a large, heavy object in a restricted space. As table 
one indicates the lift capacity for many individuals will actually be less than that 
require for many of the current designs of exits. Whilst the chances of injury are 
greatly reduced as the operator is required to operate the exit only once, the unusual 
body movements and strength required to manoeuvre the exit may lead to delays and 
even failure in operation of even the fittest operator. 
3.2 Type III exit improvement 
As section 2.5 described work has been carried out by Fennell and iMuir (199. ) 
investigating the influence of weight changes to the existing Type III exit on the ease 
of passenger operation. The reductions in weight suggested as a result of this work 
have proved difficult to employ. So in order to aid passenger ability to operate these 
exits it is necessary to redesign the way in which the exit operates making it simpler 
and easier for passengers to use. 
The following sections describe a study carried out by the Air Vehicles Design Group 
in the College of Aeronautics, Cranfield (Jones, 1995) which aimed to define and 
design an improved Type III exit so that its operation is simplified and more intuitive 
to untrained operators. The Yerkes-Dodson law described in section 2.6.2 indicates 
that that less complex the task, the more likely an individual will still be able to 
perform it successfully when suffering high levels of anxiety. Thus a reduction in 
complexity in the operation of the Type III exit, would therefore reduce the demands 
placed upon an individual completing this task. 
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3.3 Concept generation and selection 
There are a number of ways in which present doors, exits and hatches are supported 
and actuated on aircraft. A sensible step in any design process is consideration of 
designs for the same or similar applications which alreadý- exist therefore, present 
methods of motion and support of exits on aircraft were surveyed. In practice these 
are quite limited, if consideration is restricted to exits that must be available in 
emergency situations for egress. However, other doors on aircraft, such as those for 
cargo and baggage, use further methods of support, motion and latching -,, N-lilch are 
acceptable due to their not being required to be made available during emergencies. 
In addition to reviewing current exit mechanisms a whole range of concepts for the 
basic motion(s) of the Type III exit were generated, beginning with the simplest 
trans lations/rotations and progressing through combinations of these to novel or 
unusual concepts. By considering the basic advantages and disadvantages of each and 
their ability to meet selection criteria below, as required by CAA, it was possible to 
select a short list of concepts for motion of the exit. The selection criteria were as 
follows: - 
a) Must meet all current regulations in particular FAR/JAR 25.783,25.809 as 
well as all relevant ACJs (Acceptable Means of Compliance and Interpretation 
- Joint) and AMJs (Advisory Material - Joint). 
b) Must not result in reduction of the number of passenger seats in the aircraft. 
C) Must not become an internal loose item when opened. 
d) Must meet crashworthiness requirements (JAR 25.783). 
e) Operation must not be affect by icing. 
f) Must be simple and obvious to operate. 
g) Operation must be achieved with a minimum of effort. 
h) Ideally, the exit should only have one possible method of operation. 
i) Must be operable from both inside and outside the aircraft. 
j) There must be an indication of the latch state. 
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k) There must be potential for easy retrofit to existing aircraft. 
It was also stressed that the exit hatch must be positively closed by internal cabin 
pressure, requiring a 'plug' type closure with the first motion invvards and not relying 
on latches to withstand pressure loads. This was to maintain the integrity of current 
exits design, allowing retrofit. 
In addition, other factors to be taken into account were; 
i) Complexity of support, sealing and actuation, 
ii) Alterations to exit hatch and/or aperture structure 
iii) Requirement for maintenance 
iv) Any increase in drag through external excrescence's 
V) Needs for stored energy devices 
vi) Possibility of retaining a window in the exit hatch 
vii) Possibility of use of exit in non-emergency situations e. g. during on-going 
maintenance 
Concepts were short-listed for more detailed consideration in terms of consequences 
of their application to the Type III exit locations in versions of the Boeing 767. This 
aircraft was chosen due to the large mass of the present exit 30.4 kg (67 lbs), the 
number of passengers on the aircraft and therefore affected, and the close proximity of 
Cranfield to an operator of such aircraft. Using this approach final selection of a 
single concept was made and following evaluation on an AUTOCAD system 
developed into an experimental prototype. 
Figure 7 below shows the chosen concept. The inward then upward sliding exit is in 
fact one that is used on the main doors of wide bodied aircraft such as the Boeing 767 
and even older aircraft such as the Hawker Siddley Trident. Due to the need to raise 
the doors, power and/or counterbalancing is required and this can be pro'ý'ided by a 
range of methods from bungee to electric or hydraulic motors, 
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/ý- 
Upper track 
(a) Hatch closed 
/j 
ý, 
Lower track 
(deployed position) 
Lower track pivot 
(b) In transit 
Figure 7 Proposed Improved Type III exit concept 
(c) Fully open 
Trolley 
The proposed design causes no interference with seats because the exit hatch in a 
Type III application would only initially need to move inwards at the top before 
sliding up into the overhead region. However, the concept does imply some loss of 
overhead bin space for the exit hatch and tracking to pass through the area. 
The experimental prototype was produced in a very cost effective fashion and did not 
attempt to use techniques suitable for a true aircraft installation. The prototype was 
produced by using the cabin simulator's original Type III exit hatch, and v, ýith the 
addition of trim, tracks, rollers, upper support trolley and an assistance device based 
on a Tensator spring it weighed the same as the current traditional exit. 
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A more difficult design decision concerned the placement of the release handle. T,, N-o 
handle positions, as shown in Figure 8, were assessed in preliminary operation trials 
(Sibley, 1995). Whilst there appeared to be little difference in operation times, 
subjects found the option with release handle below the window easier to use. 
Operating I 
handle 
Direction of 
- -, z, ,0: 
operation 
Lower 
handhold 
Direction of 
operation 
., 9 Operating 
handle 
Figure 8 Alternative handle/handhold configurations tested in preliminary 
operation trials 
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4 IMPROVING THE MAN FOR THE TASK; Information, 
training and practice 
4.1 Introduction 
The redesign of the Type III exit, making it a simpler and easier piece of equipment for 
passengers to operate would be the ideal solution to operation problems. Ho"vever, as 
section 2.3 showed there are currently a large number of aircraft registered in the United 
Kingdom with Type III exits and the retrofit of a new design of exit would be difficult 
and costly and resisted by the industry. The alternative to "fitting the task to the 
operators' capabilities" is to improve the operator by selecting the correct person for the 
task and by providing suitable instruction and/or practice. 
In the following chapter the current methods of informing the flying public of safety 
related information, the difficulties associated with these and possible solutions drawn 
from the training literature are discussed. 
4.2 Safety briefing legislation 
The 1990 amendment to Article 36 of the 1989 Air Navigation Order (ANO) specifies: 
"The commander of an aircraft registered in the United Kingdom shall take steps to 
ensure - 
(a) before the aircraft takes off on any flight, that all passengers are made familiar 
with the position and method of use emergency exits, safety belts (with diagonal 
shoulder strap where required to be carried), safety harnesses and (where required 
to be carried) oxygen equipment, lifejackets and the floor path lighting system and 
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all other devices required by or under this Order and intended for use by 
passengers individually in the case of an emergenc, ý. ý occurring to the aircraft, and 
(b) that in an emergency during flight, all passengers are instructed in emergency 
action which they should take. " 
In addition, it is a requirement of the 1990 amended article 13 (5) of the 1989 ANO that: 
"The position of equipment provided for emergency use shall be indicated by clear 
markings in or on the aircraft. In particular every public transport aircraft registered in 
the United Kingdom there shall be - 
(a) provided for each passenger; or 
(b) if the Authority permits in writing, exhibited in a prominent position in every 
passenger compartment - 
a notice relevant to the aircraft in question containing pictorial: 
(1) instructions on the brace position to be adopted in the event of an emergency 
landing; 
(ii) instructions on the method of use of the safety belts and safety harnesses as 
appropriate; 
(iii) information as to where emergency exits are to be found and instructions as to 
how they are to be used; 
(iv) information as to where the lifejackets, escape slides, liferafts and oxygen 
masks, if required to be provided by paragraph (2) of this article, are to be found 
and instructions as to how they are to be used. 
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The legislation as it stands, states the minimum requirements regarding safet,, - on board a 
passenger aircraft. The form most commonly taken by a pre-flight briefinla, is a verbal 
narrative containing instructions and demonstrations regarding emergenc-v procedures. 
normally presented by a member of cabin staff although more recently. particularly on 
new aircraft, video presentations of pre-flight briefings are used. 
As the ANO states the passenger safety briefing must be supplemented "-ith a pictorial 
safety notice better known as a passenger safety card. The Air Operators' Certificates 
CAP360, chapter 6/22. November 1992 states that: 
"Photographs, drawings, diagrams and words can be used to depict equipment and 
operating methods; use of words should be kept to a minimum and consideration be given 
to producing a multi-lingual card for use on overseas routes. Internationally recognised 
symbols should be used. " 
As with all regulations this allows for a great variation in how the information is 
displayed. although in the United Kingdom a copy of each card currently in use must be 
lodged with the Flight operations Inspectorate. 
Passengers' attention during the pre-flight briefings is drawn to the location of the 
emergency exits. In some of the video presentations a demonstration is given of the 
operation of Type I floor level exits however these videos do not currently show how to 
operate the Type III exits. Within the United Kingdom there is a recommendation (CAP 
360, part one, chapter 6, page 6/21, para 13) that airlines should inform their passengers 
that they are seated next to a Type III exit and bring to their attention the operating 
instructions on the safety cards and the placards on the seat backs. 
The success of the Pan Am 747, San Francisco 1971 and American DC 10, Detroit, 1972 
evacuations supports the premise that the more safety information available to 
passengers, the better chance of successful evacuation. During these accidents there -v, -as 
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the chance to pre-brief passengers about the impending emergency landinLs and 
evacuations. Since during most accidents there is little opportunitl, - to predict them and 
therefore provide additional briefings, the pre-take off safety information must be 
presented to passengers so that it is easily understood and likely to be retained. More 
recently some airlines flying transatlantic routes have started to repeat the pre-flight 
safety briefing prior to landing and requesting that passengers famillarise themselves 
again with the safety card as a strategy to aid passengers' performance of safety 
procedures. 
Given the typical behavioural response of passengers to emergency situations discussed 
in section 2.6, it is evident that the content of the briefing material must be clarified to the 
greatest extent possible, so that passengers know what is expected of them in an 
emergency. Passengers in an emergency may often be expected to perform novel 
responses, such as operating emergency exits in a confusing and possibly threatening 
environment. They must respond in conditions of extreme stress which can reduce 
performance, inhibit memory and increase the likelihood of maladaptive passenger 
behaviour. 
4.3 Safety information andpassenger attention 
Despite these efforts to adequately inform passengers of the relevant safety infonnation, 
it has been reported that many passengers over estimate their knowledge of these safety 
procedures, and fail to pay attention to either safety briefings or cards (Johnson, 1979, 
Fennell et al, 1988). In a survey carried out by the Flight Safety Foundation (1970) less 
than 10% of passengers looked at the briefing card. In Fennell et al. survey, high self 
reports of attention to safety briefings (79.9%) and reading of safety cards (59.7%) on 
most flights were observed. 
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Evidence from accidents and incidents clearly indicates the failure of passengers to refer 
to safety infon-nation and the impact that this can have on their chances of survival. 
Robson (1973) highlights an example where during a warning period of an impending 
emergency landing only 20% of passengers referred to the emergency evacuation leafiets. 
In an incident when a B707 crashed short of the runway at Pago Pago, American Samoa 
in 1974, "Passenger inattentiveness to the pre-takeoff briefing and passenger information 
pamphlet" was cited by the National Transportation Safety Board as one of the three 
major post-crash survival problems. 
Lack of attention to safety briefings has been attributed by Fennell and Muir (1992) as a 
result of familiarity with pre-flight briefings and cards which can vary little between 
operators. This, they contend may lead to a feeling of boredom with the briefings, 
allowing regular passengers to feel they already know all of the relevant safety 
information. Passengers interviewed following aircraft accidents, frequently admit that 
they did not read the safety information card, and usually explain that they had read the 
cards previously and that all cards contained the same information (NTSB, 1974). 
Another more subtle reason is that safety cards must compete with other reading material 
within the cabin. 
Fennell (1992) suggests that novice or infrequent passengers who do not wish to appear 
unknowledgeable about flying may also choose not to attend to the safety briefings. 
Somewhat more concerning is the suggestion of Beck and Emery (1985) that nervous 
passengers fail to attend to safety information as a means of denial in an attempt to reduce 
their anxiety about a flight by denying the likelihood of risk. 
Becker (1973) suggested that passengers failed to attend to safety information as a result 
of feeling of powerlessness. The author maintains that the whole attitude and manner of 
delivery of emergency briefings tends to play down the significance of the information 
being presented. As a result, the passenger gets the feeling that he/she has no control 
over the environment and thus, ignores the information being presented. 
Some passengers' perceptions of the role of the cabin crew maý, have an impact on their 
attention to safety information. Cabin Crew's primary role under the Air navigation 
Order (1990) is the safety of passengers. They are highly trained individuals and it is the 
belief of many passengers that cabin crew are responsible for their safety and ývjll help 
them in an emergency (Fennell & Muir, 1992). It is very unlikel%1 that in the event of an 
emergency that cabin crew members would be able to help all those passengers onboard 
so it is particularly important that passengers need to assume some responsibility for 
themselves, particularly those seated next to self help exits such as the Type III exit. 
Some passengers may perceive that their chances of survival should they be unfortunate 
to be involved in an aircraft emergency as minimal and as such there is little that they 
could do to save themselves or alternatively that 'it wouldn't happen to me' (Johnson, 
1979). 
Johnson (1979) suggested that non-attenders were more likely to be frequent flyers, 
business passengers and those who fly alone. Fennell, et al. (1988) confirmed many of 
Johnson's findings. Interestingly in their study business and frequent flyers who reported 
that they paid less frequent attention to safety briefings and cards had higher levels of 
knowledge of safety procedures. This finding implies that many non attenders pay less 
attention to the briefings because they have more not less knowledge of safety 
information. Fennell et al. (1988) concluded that it is more important to gain the 
attention of those with limited safety knowledge and those passengers that may be most 
in need of knowing the safety procedures such as older passengers, females, 
inexperienced passengers and those flying mainly for pleasure. 
Research into methods of increasing passengers' motivation to pay attention to the 
briefing has included altering the introduction to the pre-flight briefing to place greater 
emphasis on its importance (Fennell, 1992). Fishbein & Ajzen (1975) suggest t, vo 
strategies by which peoplps underlying beliefs and attitudes may be changed; these being 
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participation and persuasive communication. If passengers lack of attention to briefings 
is as a result of a belief that they are unimportant or unnecessary the utilisation of 
practical safety training as advocated by Green (1986) or education in the media about 
safety related issues (Graber, 1989) may be beneficial in increasing passenger attention to 
safety information. 
4.4 Instruction and training 
Instruction and training techniques used to instruct trainees generally fall into three 
categories; telling the learner what to do, showing the learner what to do, by 
demonstration or guidance or having the learner practice what to do. 
4.4.1 Telling the passenger how to operate the exit 
Most training programmes start with a verbal explanation of what the learner is required 
to do. Holding (1987) described verbal instructions as useful for defining the goals of 
training, the rules which must be applied in order to execute the task and verbal feedback 
(useful in improving motivation of trainees). Whilst efficient and economical, verbal 
. instructions shouldbe 
treated with caution for a number of reasons. Firstly they can 
convey a vast amount of information which may overload the working memory of 
trainees (Sweller, 1988). Secondly the teaching of perceptual -motor activities through 
verbal instructions is difficult because trainees find translating the verbal instructions into 
the perceptual - motor activity difficult. Holding also notes that verbal instructions can be 
interpreted differently by trainers and trainees, which can reduce their effectiveness. 
The pre-flight passenger safety briefing consists of predominately verbal instructions and 
incorporates an element of demonstration of some of the emergency equipment. During 
the briefing, a large amount of information is presented in a relatively short time. This is 
likely to exceed the memory capacity of many of the passengers particularly those who 
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are inexperienced passengers with little or no previous knowledge of safety procedures 
and equipment. 
4.4.2 Showing the passenger how to operate the exit 
Showing the learner what to do can be an effective method of teaching behaviours, 
providing the learner with important visual feedback, and reducing the likelihood of 
errors (Holding, 1987). Demonstration as defined by Patrick (1992). typically provides 
the trainee with some form of guidance, which shows the trainee what has to be achieved 
either directly or indirectly through some symbolic coding. Such a strategy ma"', be 
useful in the earlier stages of learning, since it narrows down the range of alternative 
actions, but it should be supplemented by direct practice (Holding, 1987), allowing the 
trainee to imitate the actions of the trainer. 
Whilst the pre-flight briefing is usually accompanied by demonstration, currentl, ý' 
passengers have no opportunity to imitate the actions required. As a result passengers 
may under estimate the complexity of some of the procedures and never have the 
opportunity to test whether they would be able to accurately remember and replicate the 
actions demonstrated to them. 
4.4.2.1 Safety briefing cards 
Illustrations can be useful as a method of showing the trainee what to do. According to 
Johnson (1980), the concepts about which information is to be conveyed can range from 
simple to complex. Instructions for simple concepts are given to perform a single action 
about which the why and when are obvious. A complex concept is one where multiple 
actions are required and multiple results can ensue. The when and why an action is to be 
perfon-ned may not be obvious. Johnson goes further to make the point that the concepts 
in question can range from concrete (such as an emergency door) to abstract (math no 
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physical referent, such as the general notion of danger). Table 2 below shows his 
proposed methods for conveying instructional methods. 
Table 2 Proposed methods for conveying instructional information 
Concrete data Abstract data 
Simple Use pictures/words Use symbols/words 
Complex Use pictograms/words Use words 
According to Paivio (1978), any given stimulus can be encoded in our memory verbally 
or visually or both verbally and visually. The type of encoding is dependent upon the 
nature of the task and the information presented. Paivio's theory, the dual-trace 
hypothesis, argues that pictures are better remembered than words. The theory states that 
words are coded verbally, whereas pictures are coded both verbally and visually. The 
ability to react to and understand information is greatly expanded when the information is 
presented through both visual and auditory means (Berger, 1970; Bashman and 
Treadwell, 1995; Stone and Glock, 1991) 
In the NTSB safety study (1985) concern was raised that whilst some airlines have used 
firms to develop safety cards using an iterative design process whereby naive subjects are 
shown prototype cards and then asked to explained their interpretation or understanding 
of the information, many still continue to develop their own cards "which contain 
confusing and incomplete information". 
Some research was carried out by Douglas aircraft company in the 1970's to identifý, the 
best means of presenting safety information on briefing cards. Altman et al. (1970) 
carried out a study investigating participants of the studies 
"most -to least" preferred style 
of presentation. The study examined twenty-one safety 
briefing cards used by domestic 
and international airlines. In general, the presentation style preferred 
by most judges was 
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that of simple sequential action, graphic displays of information with a minimum of 
keyword descriptors. Altman et al's. study can be criticised and the results taken with 
some caution as all of the participants in the study were English speaking and their results 
are based on participants preferences not their understanding or ability to perform the 
safety actions. 
The NTSB safety study (1985) refers to research evaluating pictorial safety cards. The 
research evaluated the use of colour and photographs and found no statistical difference 
between colour photographs and diagrams and both were more effecti-, 'e than if they had 
been black and white. Colour was found to be particularly useful in highligghting 
important procedural actions such as the direction an emergency handle turned. Further 
work carried out by Douglas referenced in the NTSB study showed that passengers 
donning lifejackets had slightly more understanding of illustrations than photographs 
because the illustrations were able to highlight certain features which was not possible 
with photographs. 
Johnson et al. (1973) carried out four large scale evacuation demonstrations during which 
they evaluated the benefit of different briefing card information on the jumper/sitter ratio 
on the evacuation slides. The four test groups were passengers who did not have a 
briefing card to look at (simulating those who do not attend), two slightly different cards 
with additional written instructions next to the diagrams showing how to use the slides to 
"jump" and a final group who were given cards with written instructions to "jump, don't 
sit". The results indicated that the use of written instructions on the briefing cards could 
be useful as significantly fewer people sat when reading cards with the "Titten 
information than those who were given no briefing card. Significantly more passengers 
who were told to "jump - don't sit" jumped onto the slide than those who were told to 
"jump". This work again failed to provide a true comparison group as none of the 
passengers were given a briefing card without additional wording, so the true benefit of 
additional written instructions could not be evaluated. 
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Boher (1975) however, carried out a study investigating the benefit of words and pictures 
displayed together and found words or short statements with pictures "-as the most 
efficient in communicating procedural information. A further study by Barriard and 
Marcel (1984) indicated that such a method of presentation was particularly good for 
novel information. Whilst the international aviation language is English, the major 
concern with the introduction of language on briefing cards is the impact that this might 
have on those individuals who do not speak or understand English. 
4.4.2.2 Video safety briefings 
The use of multimedia systems such as video presentations and multi-media computers 
utilising a mix of audio and visual channels for communication can have a dramatic effect 
on learning and long-term retention. Bayard-white (1990) claimed that we remember 
about: 
10% of what we read 
20% of what we hear 
30% of what we see 
50% of what we see and hear 
80% of what we say 
90% of what we say and do at the same time. 
The integration of experiences from different senses has been shown to be more resistant 
to forgetting and is used as the basis for many devices to aid memory (Hunter, 1964; 
Yates, 1966). Stoneman and Brody (1983) have shown that the presence of moving 
images can serve to enhance comprehension and learning of spoken material. 
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The use of safety briefing videos is slowly becoming more %ý-idespread in the industrý-. 
Several studies have attempted to show the benefits of presenting safetý' related 
information in video format. A study by Johnson (19733) showed that video instructions 
for the donning of life vests were 40 percent more effective in reducing the time to don 
life jackets than either safety briefings cards or cabin crew oral instructions 
accompanying a demonstration. This method of briefing still resulted in 29ý0 of the 
viewers not being able to perform the simplest and essential steps of the donning, 
Johnson suggested that this was possibly due to the complexity of the life-jacket itself 
Johnson et al. (1973) investigated the benefits of video briefings further by presenting 
black and white videotaped safety information to potential aircraft passengers in three 
domains: 
1. What they should do (DO) 
2. What they should not do (DONT) 
3. The reason why (WHY) 
Information covered II content areas relevant to an overland flight, including the brace 
position. Seven groups were presented with different combinations of DO, DONT and 
WHY on each content area. 
The videotape presentation resulted in significant improvements in knowledge of 
appropriate knowledge related behaviours. The DO and DONT 
information when 
combined produced significantly better results than when presented 
individually. The 
WHY information had no significant effect on increasing the participants' knowledge of 
which behaviours should or should not be performed. 
Whilst videos may provide a simple, time effective method of 
display the use of safety 
equipment, including some that is otherwise only 
displayed on the safety cards (exit 
operation) a major problem with such a strategy 
is that the timing of the material is 
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inflexible. The viewer has no control over the rate at which the information is presented. 
and unlike the reader of text, cannot refer back or check previous information. 
4.4.3 Practice 
According to Patrick (1992) the most powerful method of training is to allow the trainee 
to perform the task themselves providing them with feedback on the correctness of their 
action. This knowledge of results can come from either the task itself, or from the trainer. 
The provision of such feedback allows trainees to amend their actions making them more 
accurate and automatic. This strategy applies to any type of learning, including the 
learning of facts, concepts procedures, motor skills and cognitive strategies. 
The efficiency of practice not only depends on participants' knowledge of results but on 
its spacing and content. Practising is likely to be fatiguing unless adequate rest pauses 
are given, however the practicalities of training provision often determine the schedule of 
training. 
In order that the full benefits of practise are realised it is sometimes necessary to provide 
part task learning. Some tasks are so simple that they can be taught in their entirety, 
however others are so complex that it is not possible to learn a skill from the beginning in 
one practice session. In this instance the entire task is broken down into sub-units which 
are practised separately. If this strategy is used it is important that practice follows a 
logical sequence allowing trainees to build on their knowledge and experience. 
4.4.3.1 Airport Safety Centres 
The implementation of safety centres in airport departure lounges has been proposed as a 
low stress environment where passengers could practise using emergency equipment 
(Blythe, 1986 and Green, 1986). Trained staff would be able to provide information, 
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gui ance and feedback about performance of these novel procedures. It is argued that 
such safety centres could be used to educate passengers about safety issues and encourage 
them to take the responsibility for their own safety. Green (1986) went ftirther to suggest 
that check-in-staff assigning passengers to the seat next to the ovený, ing exit could ask 
them to visit the centre to practise operating the exit. He also pointed out that by ai"'ing 
these passengers a task to perform in an emergency would increase the likelihood of them 
performing quickly and correctly 
There are difficulties associated with the possible introduction of safety centres. Firstly, 
who should pay to equip, maintain and staff the centres. Historically there has been 
negative feedback from some airlines who resist the introduction of safety centres due to 
their costs and possible liability should a passenger be injured in a centre or were 
incorrectly taught or wrongly interpreted the safety procedures (Fennell, 1992). 
Green pointed out that such centres may have problems due to the reaction of the general 
public - it is possible that no-one would visit them or they may be totally overwhelmed 
by the number of interested passengers. Another practical problem with the introduction 
of safety centres is the lack of standardisation of safety equipment onboard aircraft which 
may lead problems in transfer of training if passengers have become familiar with one 
type of equipment in a safety centre only to encounter a different type onboard their 
aircraft. 
Mitchell (1992) clearly showed the benefits of allowing passengers to practice using 
emergency equipment. Participants in her study not only took less time, but were more 
accurate in their performance of tasks. During the debrief of participants it became 
apparent that the majority were in favour of some form of training to be made available to 
passengers in departure lounges. 
One of the main arguments against safety centres is the problem of non standardisation of 
safety equipment. Parkinson (1994) however, showed that passengers ý,, ý'ho had been 
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trained on one type of life-jacket only to encounter another type in a simulated emergency 
where able to don their lifejacket as quickly as their counterparts who had received 
training on an identical lifejacket to the one in the simulated emergency. Hovvever. "vhilst 
they were not as accurate in their performance they were superior to those who had 
received no training at all. 
4.6 Retention ofprocedural tasks 
Procedural tasks such as the operation of safety equipment usually involve a set of 
individual, discrete motor responses which must be perfon-ned in a particular order. 
Unlike continuous tasks (such as tracking) which are relatively well retained over time 
procedural tasks appear to be highly susceptible to the effects of forgetting (Schendel and 
Hagman, 1982). 
Skills that are infrequently practised such as emergency or safety functions often show 
deterioration to the point of being problematic (Hagman and Rose, 1983)), even after 
relatively short intervals of no practice (Johnson, 1981). In a study by Shields et al. 
(1979) evaluating the retention of 20 common soldier tasks, the best predictor of 
forgetting rate was found to be the number of performance steps required by the task. 
The main deten-ninant of procedural skill retention is the level of original learning of a 
task. The positive effects of overtraining on retention have been well established 
(Atwater, 1953; Gagne and Foster, 1949). Overtraining allows trainees to practise tasks 
beyond the achievement of correct performance. WUlst initial overtraining may defer 
forgetting, it cannot prevent it and refresher training is required. 
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4.7 Transfer of training 
Transfer of training to the work situation is paramount. Transfer of training occurs "vhen 
the effects of prior learning influence the performance of a later activivy (Holding. 199 1 
An example of transfer of training is carrying over the effects of practice ', ", -ith the right 
hand bouncing a ball to bouncing a ball with the left hand. Positive transfer has occured 
if learning a new task improves performance of a second task. It sometimes happens that 
learning a new task hinders the acquisition of a second task and this is termed negative I 
transfer (Holding, 1977). 
The two major viewpoints that describe the conditions necessary for transfer are the 
identical-elements and the transfer-through-principle theories. Identical -elements theory 
proposed by Thorridike and Woodworth (1901) predicted that transfer would occur as 
long as there were identical elements in the two situations. These identical elements 
included aims, methods and approaches and are defined in terms of stimulus and 
responses. If the tasks are identical in training and transfer, trainees are simply practising 
the final task during the training program and there should be high positive transfer. If, as 
is common to many training programs, the stimuli are somewhat different in training and 
transfer settings, but the responses are the same, the learner can generalise training from 
one environment to the other. Negative transfer is likely when the stimulus conditions 
are similar in the training and work enviromnents, but the response requirements are 
different. 
One method of increasing the similarity between the training and transfer environment, is 
through the use of simulators. It is quite possible that a safety centre in the airport could 
be designed to represent an aircraft cabin interior. However given the difficulties with 
variations in equipment and the problems in predicting all of the emergency situations 
that may arise the alternative to identical-elements, transfer through principles may be of 
more relevance. The principles theory suggests that training should focus on the general 
principles necessary to learn a task so that the learner maý' applý' them to solve problems 
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in the transfer task. As a result performance is more flexible and adaptable which can be 
applied in a variety of circumscribed situations (McGehee and Thayer, 196 1). General 
principles also seem to be more resistant to forgetting than procedural rules. 
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5. RATIONALE FOR THE THESIS 
Type III exits are a useful means of escape (Johnson, 1984; Chandler, George and 
Polard, 1987) and they exist on a large proportion of the airline fleet. The findings of 
research into passenger access to and opening of the Type III exit as well as accident 
experience, have clearly demonstrated that many passengers still haý'-e great difficulty 
in operating, and evacuating through, this class of exit (e. Q. Fennell and Muir, 199-3)). 
Furthermore, evidence of maladaptive behaviours exhibited by passengers and the 
impact of elevated levels of anxiety on individuals ability to perform eý-en the 
simplest tasks (Yerkes-Dobson, 1906; Johnson, 1984) forms the rationale for the work 
carried out in the thesis. There are two different approaches to improving passenger 
performance these being improvement and simplification of the task itself or the 
provision of better instr-uction for the passenger seated next to the exit. The tv'ýo 
experiments investigate these two design options. 
5.1 Experiment One: exit redesign andpractice 
In order to remove the problem of requiring passengers to manoeuvre the large, heavy 
exit hatch in the cramped conditions of the cabin the Air vehicles Design group began 
work on the definition of an improved Type III exit under a Civil Aviation Contract. 
One of the most important design criteria was that the exit hatch was to be constrained 
in motion so that it did not become a loose item once opened. The chosen concept 
was developed into a working model which then required testing so that the impact of 
the new overwing exit on passenger performance and accuracy could be made. The 
first study aimed to compare passenger operation of the traditional Type III exit with 
the modified exit. The influence of the operators' sex and handeness as well as 
seating configuration on passenger ease of operation of the two types of exit were also 
made. In accordance with criteria adopted for testing by the CAA, the effect of an 
incapacitated passenger seated immediately adjacent to the exit on exit operation vvus 
also assessed. 
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Finally, this experiment aimed to explore the benefits of practice on passengers abilitv 
to operate both the traditional and modified exits. 
5.1.1 Objectives 
1. To investigate the influence of modifications to the design and operation of the 
Type III exit and the influence on passengers' speed and accuracy of operation. 
2. To investigate the impact of passengers' sex and handedness on the operation of 
the traditional and modified exit. 
3. To investigate the influence of the two seating configurations specified in AN 79 
on traditional and modified exit operation times. 
4. To investigate the influence of an 'incapacitated passenger' in the seat adjacent to 
the exit, on the ease of operation of the traditional and modified Type III exit. 
5. To assess the potential benefits of training members of the public in the operation 
of the traditional and modified Type III exits. 
5.2 Experiment Two: Method of instruction 
Due to the difficulties detailed in section 4.4.3.1 and the lack of success in introducing 
safety centres to date the possibility of providing passengers with comprehensive 
training in Type III exit operationis currently not available as a result. A study of the 
alternative methods of briefing passengers about how to operate the exit is required. 
Currently there is no regulation requiring that passengers seated next to the exit 
receive a specific briefing about the Type III operation, they are simply informed that 
they are sat next to an exit, they may be required to operate it in an emergency and 
that they should note the operating instructions. 
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The preceeding chapters have discussed possible variations in instruction and training 
techniques as well as research evaluating alterriative methods of displa-ving 
instructions. 
The second experiment compared passenger speed and accuracy when operating the 
Type III exit following a variety of modes of instruction. The modes of instruction 
were as follows: 
no briefing card. This condition simulated passengers who do not read the safety 
information on briefing cards. 
briefing card. Four variations of exit operation diagrams: 
Colour photographs with operator shown 
Colour pictures with operator shown 
Colour pictures and words with operator shown 
Colour picture without operator shown 
no briefing card, the cabin crew member gave the passenger sat adjacent to the 
exit an additional verbal description of how to operate the Type III exit. 
no briefing card, the passenger sat adjacent to the exit was shown a video of the 
Type III being operated. 
5.2.1 Objectives 
1. To investigate whether instruction on the operation of the Type III exit is 
beneficial. 
2. To investigate whether showing people rather than telling them how to operate the 
exit results in an improvement in performance. 
3. To assess any differences in accuracy and performance of Type III exit disposal as 
a result of variation in safety briefing card presentation and content. 
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4. To investigate whether the use of animated instructions improve passengers 
performance. 
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6 EXPERIMENT ONE: EXIT REDESIG. NAN. D THE 
INFLUENCE OF PRACTICE 
6.1 Research Design 
Members of the public were recruited to take part in a research programme in 
which each participant was required to operate a Type III exit on three occasions. 
Half of the participants operated the exit with the traditional mechanism and half 
operated the exit with the modified mechanism. These two groupings vvere 
further subdivided in order to assess the influence of changes to the seating 
configuration adjacent to the exit. The seating configurations tested involved the 
two options specified in the Airworthiness Notice No 79 (1989). One involved a 
thirteen inch vertical projection between the seat rows adjacent to the exit and the 
other a six inch vertical projection between the seat rows and the remo"'al of the 
outboard seat. The tests involving the thirteen inch vertical projection between 
the seat rows were replicated with a 50th percentile male dummy, simulating a 
incapacitated passenger unable to operate the exit. During the test the hatch 
weight was kept constant at 21.5kgs (similar to a Boeing 737 hatch). 
Table Three shows the number of participants in each of the experimental 
conditions. A total of 96 participants took part (48 operating the modified exit 
and 48 operating the traditional exit) with equal numbers of left and right handed 
males and females in each condition. 
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Table 3 The numbers of participants in each of the experimental test 
conditions 
Modified Type III exit design Traditional Type III exit design 
Left handed Right handed Left handed Right handed 
M F M F Al F 11 F 
13" Vertical 
projection 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
13" Vertical 
projection - Dummy 4 4 4 14 4 4 4 4 
OSR 4 4 4 4 14 4 4 4 
USK = Outboard seat removed 
6.1.1 Ethical consideration 
Key issues should be considered during the initial stages of any applied research 
programme. These issues are covered in "The Ethical Code of Conduct", available to 
all those undertaking research at Cranfield University. Prior to carrying out this 
investigation, an ethics proposal was submitted to the Ethics Committee. This 
committee deals with all of the Cranfield Department of Psychologys' research. The 
normal ethical considerations of confidentiality of data, safety and welfare of 
participants, voluntary participation and knowledge of results were adhered to. 
6.1.2 Methodological considerations 
Problems arise with any investigation of emergency behaviour. As described in 
section 2.6, in a real emergency the stress of the situation is likely to influence the 
manner in which individuals behave. Even research into a sensitive 
issue such as an 
aircraft emergency may be psychologically 
disturbing for test participants if not 
handled with care. On the other hand, any attempt to 
identify behaviour or the 
problems likely to be experienced by individuals 
in a non-representative situation NN-111 
lack validity. The use of a cabin mock-up provides the opportunity to obsen-e 
passenger behaviour in a controlled environment. 
This N-,, ould allo, ý\- the ability of 
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participants to perform safety procedures, and any problems doing so, to be identified 
without involving personal risk to test participants. 
The fidelity of the simulation described in this thesis, was increased by giving test II 
participants a pre-flight safety briefing, after they were seated on board the aircraft 
followed by simulated emergency scenarios 
As in previous exit operation studies test participants operated the exit on their own 
without any other 'passengers' on the aircraft. This enabled the impact of the desi-, -, n 
of the exit mechanism on operator performance to be assessed without risk to others 
in the cabin. However, it is recognised that the problems experienced in a real 
emergency, or accident, situation are likely to be worse in a simulation as they are 
likely to be adversely affected by other passengers crowding into this area. 
6.1.3 Equipment 
61.3.1 The cabin mock-up 
The experimental tests took place on board the single aisle cabin simulator in the 
College of Aeronautics at Cranfield. Ten rows of triple seats were located along either 
side of the cabin fuselage. A fully functioning Type III exit of either the modified or 
traditional design was fitted half way down the side of the fuselage (see Appendix B 
for modified exit details). The seat rows adjacent to the Type III exit were arranged in 
accordance with AN79 1989, either paragraph 4.1.1 or 4.1.2 (see Appendix C for 
diagrams). 
In the aircraft cabin simulator, when there were rows of triple seats forming the exit 
aisle the seats fore and aft of the Type III exit were at a seat pitch of approximately 38 
inches (97 cm) with a vertical projection between the seats of 13 inches (33' cm) This 
vertical projection was used so the exit seat row did not extend beyond the exit centre 
line thus complying with paragraph 4.1.1 in AN79 (see Appendix Q. %Vlien the 
outboard seat removed configuration was used the seats fore and aft of the Type 
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exit were at a seat pitch of approximately IS inches (45 cm) with a -,,, -ertical projection 
of 6 inches (15 cm). The seat back of each seat xhich formed the boundary of the 
access route to the Type III exit was restricted in its movement in accordance with 
AN79 1989 paragraph 4.33. 
Figure 9 The cabin simulator 
6.1.3,2 The Type III exits 
The dimensions of both the modified and traditional exit hatch in the cabin simulator 
were representative of those on a narrow bodied transport aircraft. The vertical step- 
Lip from the floor to the bottom of each exit inside the cabin was 133.5 inches 
(334.4cms), identical to that of a Boeing 737 aircraft. The step-down height from the 
bottom of each door onto the wing was 15 inches (338cms) which althOUgh is identical 
to a Bocing 7_337, is considerably less than the maximum 23) inches (58.5cms) allowed 
(Edwards and Edwards, 1990). 
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The handle mechanism of the traditional Type III exit operated in the standard 
manner. In accordance with the Type III exit operating instruction requirements. the 
word 'PULL' was written in white on this handle mechanism and at the top of the exit 
there was a red arrow pointing downwards on either side of the handle (JA R 25 -813 )) - 
The handle mechanism and operating instructions for the modified Type III exit had 
*PULL' written in white on the operating handle and red arrows either side of the 
handle. 
In accordance with AN79 requirements, safety placards illustrating the operating 
method for the traditional and modified Type III exits were located on the back of 
each seat in the row forming the access to the exit during all the trials. The illustration 
depicting the operating method of the traditional exit was based on those currentlý' 
used on Boeing 737 aircraft. A new safety placard was designed for use with the 
modified Type III exit design (both of these can be found in Appendix D). 
6.1.4 Data Acquisition 
Video cameras were located inside and outside the cabin, in order to record the 
manner in which participants opened and disposed of the Type III exit. The cameras 
were fitted with a time base function and microphones to provide the information 
required for the data analysis. 
A short questionnaire was used to identify any problems experienced by participants 
when opening the exit and evacuating onto the wing. In this questionnaire participants 
were asked to assess the ease with which they considered they were able to open the 
exit and evacuate from the cabin and to indicate the nature of any difficulties 
experienced in completing the task (see Appendix E). 
As all the participants operated an exit three times, a shortened version of the 
questionnaire was completed by participants after the second and third time they 
operated the exit. In the shortened version of the questionnaire. participants were 
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asked if their experience in operating the exit in the first and second tests affected the 
manner in which they subsequently operated the exit. 
6.1.5 Participants 
A total of 96 participants took part in the study, 48 in each phase. Exactly equal 
numbers of left and right handed males and females operated each desian of Type III 
exit. The participants were recruited by campus advertising and through the use of the 
Department of Applied Psychology's participant database. In order for the 
participants to be representative of those individuals in the population who ý,, ý-ere 
expected to encounter most difficulties in completing the task, the maximum hei,, ht 
and weight of participants recruited for these tests was decided using the cnteria for 
fiftieth percentile UK males and females, as indicated in Table four. None of the 
participants had previously operated a Type III exit. 
Table 4 Fiftieth percentile height and weight for males and females 
50th Percentile Height 50th Percentile Weight 
Males 175cm 70kg 
Female 161 cm 64kg 
6.1.6 Procedure 
The 48 male and 48 female participants were each assigned to one of the experimental 
conditions, such that there were eight males and eight females in each. A member of 
the research team, trained and dressed as a cabin crew member, briefed each 
participant about the nature of the test upon his/her arrival at the College of 
Aeronautics. In order to maximise the realism, the participants were not told about the 
precise nature of the test but were forewarned that they might be required to lift a 
weight equivalent to that of a heavy suitcase (potential participants %vith health 
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problems were screened out during recruitment). Par-ticipants were then asked to 
complete a consent form indicating that they understood the general nature of the 
study and that they believed they were physicall-y able to take part in the test. 
In the experimental conditions when a dummy was not present, the participant v, -as sat 
in the seat adjacent to the Type III exit. In the experimental conditions v"hen the 
dummy was present, the dummy was positioned, with the seat belt fastened, in the 
seat adjacent to the Type III exit and the participant sat next to the dummy (see 
Appendix Q. 
Once seated inside the cabin, each participant was given a modified pre-flight safety 
briefing by a member of the research team (a transcript of this can be found in 
Appendix F). The safety briefing included a demonstration of the method of operation 
of the seat belt and oxygen mask, as well as the location of the Type III and other 
exits. This briefing also drew the participants attention to the safety briefing card 
situated in seat pocket of the seat in front of them. In accordance with recommended 
procedure in CAP 360, Part one, Chapter 6 Page 6/21 Paragraph 1.3 the following 
statement was used 'I would like to draw your attention to the fact that you are sat by 
an emergency exit, should there be an emergency you would be expected to operate 
this exit. Instructions showing the method of operation can be found on the safety 
briefing card in the seat pocket in front of you and on the safety placard on the back 
of the seat here'. 
The member of the research team then checked that the participant's seat belt was 
fastened securely and positioned him/herself at the rear of the cabin. The participants 
heard one of three different engine noise scenarios (see Appendix G), before being 
issued with the instruction to 'Undo your seat belt and get out'. If the participants 
were hesitant in moving towards the exit (that is, if they had not begun to open the 
exit after five seconds) the researcher shouted the instruction 'Over-wing exit' in order 
to hurry the participant. The test continued until the participant had successfully 
opened the exit and evacuated through the Type III exit , or had given up on the task 
voluntaril,,,,. After this first test had been completed each participant was asked to fill 
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in a short questionnaire in order to identify any problems they had experienced in 
carrying out the task. 
The test procedure was then repeated twice more with each participant (no additional 
training or help was offered from the cabin crew member). On each occasion the 
participant was given a modified pre-flight safety briefing and seated in the same 
position as before. A different engine noise scenario was used with each trial in order 
that participants did not anticipate the call to evacuate. After completing the third test 
and questionnaire the participant was debriefed and thanked for taking part in the test. 
before being paid his/her attendance fee. 
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6.2 RES UL TS 
6.2.1 Individual characteristics of the participants 
6.2. ]. 1 Modified Type III exit 
The mean age of all of the participants was 33.85 years, 34.67 years for males (v, -Ith 
ages ranging between 20 and 48 years) and 33 years for females (with ages ranging 
between 20 and 48 years). The male participants had a mean height and weight of 
172.29cm and 69.17kgs. The female participants had a mean height and weight of 
160.70cm and 59.46kgs respectively. The median frequency of exercise for males 
and females was once or twice a week. All but three participants had previouslý 
flown on an aircraft before and the median category on the questionnaire for total 
number of return flights taken by the participants was 6-10 flights. 
6.2.1.2 Traditional Type III exit. 
The mean age of all of the participants was 31.17 years; 31.08 years for males (with 
ages ranging between 21 and 49 years) and 31.25 years for females (with ages ranging 
between 20 and 48 years). The male participants had a mean height and weight of 
173.58cm and 71.67kgs. The female participants had a mean height and weight of 
161.83cm and 59.13kgs respectively. The median frequency of exercise for males 
and females was once or twice a week. All but three participants had previously 
flown on an aircraft before and the median category on the questionnaire for total 
number of return flights taken by the participants was I 1- 15 flights. 
There were no significant differences between the age, height, weight and frequency 
of exercise taken by participants in the two types of exit mechanisms as tables 5-8 
show. 
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Table 5 An independent t-test summary table for participant age across 
the two exit types 
N Mean S. D S. E t df Probability 
Traditional exit 48 31.17 8.57 1.23 1.51 94 0.1134 
Modified exit 48 33.83 8.69 1.25 
Table 6 An independent t-test summary table for participant height across t5 
the two exit types 
N Mean S. D S. E df Probability 
Traditional exit 48 167.71 7.48 1.08 -0.83 94 0.409 
Modified exit 48 166.54 6.24 0.9 
Table 7 An independent t-test summary table for participant weight across 
the two exit types 
N Mean S. D S. E t df Probability 
Traditional exit 48 65.39 8.97 1.29 -0.67 94 0.505 
Modified exit 48 64.31 6.74 0.973 
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Table 8 An independent t-test summan., table for participant frequenc. -v of 
strenuous exercise across the two exit types 
N Mean 
Traditional exit 48 2.37 
Modified exit 48 2.39 
S. D S. E 
1.12 
1.25 
0.162 
1.80 
df Probability 
0.09 94 0.93" 
6.2.2 The operation of the Type III exit 
The participant's times to evacuate were obtained from the video recordings. The 
camera's internal time base and audio recordings provided information on the time it 
took for each evacuation and the way in which the participant opened and disposed of 
the Type III exit. The evacuation time was calculated from the point at which the 
participant's hand touched the operating handle, to when he or she had put one foot 
onto the wing. This particular starting point was taken so that any variation in the 
delay of participants responding to the call to evacuate was not included in the 
analysis. The mean reaction time of participants to respond to the call to evacuate 
(from the call 'Undo your seat belt and get out' to when their hand was on the 
operating handle) was 4.94 seconds for the traditional Type III exit and 4.14 seconds 
for the modified exit. 
6.2.3 The influence of the Type III exit operation mechanism 
The mean times taken by participants to open the modified and traditional Type III 
exits in the first test conducted by each participant in the three seating configurations 
are shown in Table 9. This is graphically represented in Figure 10. The raw data 
giving demographic details for each participant and the times taken by each 
participant to operate the Type III exit in each of the three tests they performed can be 
found in Appendix H. The data from the previous Type III exit operation research 
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carried out at Cranfield University (Fennell and Muir, 199-3) involving the traditional 
Type III exit is alsO included in Table 9. 
The mean times taken by participants to operate the Type III exit, in all of the 
conditions in the recent research were consistently quicker than those recorded in the 
previous testing. A number of factors could have contributed to these differences, 
they include improved Type III exit operation diagrams, alterations in the cabin 
simulator improving realism and a reduction in the weight of the exit hatch from 
25kgs to 21.5kgs. 
Table 9 Mean times (in seconds) taken by participants from hand on 
handle to exit and evacuate onto the wing (standard deviations are 
shown in parentheses). 
TEST ONE. 
Outboard seat removed 13" Vertical Projection 13" Vertical Projection 
No Dummy Present Dummy Present 
Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Modified Type 111 4.17 3.76 4.47 33.90 7.73 6.61 
(0.97) (1.43) (1.83) (1.00) (3.74) (2.93) 
Traditional Type 111 10.76 9.45 13.15 8.78 18.04 133.26 
(4.28) (3.32) (4.78) (1.28) (7.33) (7.79) 
Previous t sting N/T N/T 19.63 9.96 31.87 21.95 
(7.12) (2.10) (14.11) (11.48) 
N/T - Configuration Not tested 
It can be seen from Table 9 that the mean times for each experimental condition in 
test one of the recent research ranged from 3.76 seconds for males operating the 
modified Type III exit with the outboard seat removed, to 18.04 seconds for females 
operating the traditional Type III exit with the dummy present. The data from the 
previous test programme will not be included in the subsequent analyses. A four-v, -ay 
analysis of variance was performed using SPSS for windows, allowing the nfluence 
of the door mechanism, seating configuration, participant handedness and sex on exit 
Previous testing data for a traditional Type III exit weight 25kgs (Fennell and MU r, 1993) 
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operation speed and accuracy, during test one, to be assessed. All of the subjects data 
was entered as none of the trials had to be halted and all subjects managed to evacuate 
on to the wing. Table 10 shows the ANOVA summary table. 
Table 10 Analysis of Variance summary table; the influence of door type, 
seating condition, participant handedness and sex on exit 
operation time (test one). 
Sums of squares DF Mean square F Sig. of F 
Main Effects 1714.95 5 342.99 22.11 0.0001 
Door type 1220.51 1 1220.51 78.69 0.0001 
Seating condition 364.15 2 182.08 11.74 0.0001 
Handedness 25.15 1 25.15 1.62 0.207 
Sex 105.13 1 105.13 6.78 0.011 
2-way Interaction 191.02 9 21.23 1.37 0.219 
Door type S. condition 23.36 2 11.68 0.75 0.475 
Door type Handedness 20.00 1 20.00 1.29 0.260 
Door type Sex 46.62 1 46.62 3.01 0.087 
S. condition Handedness 80.77 2 40. -3) 
9 2.60 0.81 
S. condition Sex 19.19 2 9.59 0.62 0.793 
Handedness Sex 1.07 1 1.07 0.07 0.793 
3-way interactions 118.97 7 16.99 1.09 0.375 
Door type S. condition Handedness 91-88 45.94 2.96 0.58 
Door type S. condition Sex 10.844 2 5.42 0.35 0.706 
Door type Handedness Sex 3.38 1 3.38 0.22 0.642 
S. condition Handedness Sex 12.87 2 6.44 0.42 
0.662 
4-way Interactions 35.939 2 17.97 1.16 0.3 20 
Door type S. condition Handedness 35-939 2 17.97 1.16 0. -3) 
20 
Sex 
Explained 2060.88 2 -33 
89.603 5.77 0.0001 
Residual 1116.74 72 15.51 
Total 3177.62 95 33.449 
The mean time of 12.24 seconds for all participants operating the traditional 
Type III 
exit regardless of seating configuration was significantly slower than the time of 
5.11 
seconds for the modified Type III exit (F 1,72 -= 
78.69, p=0.0001). This data is 
graphically represented in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10 Graphical representation of mean times (in seconds) taken by 
participants from hand on handle to exit and evacuate onto the 
wing 
TEST ONE. 
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6.2.4 The influence of seating condition 
OSR - Female 
Ei OSR - Male 
0 IY' No Dummy - Fernale 
0 13" No Dummy - Male 
M 13" Dummy - Female 
IR 13" Dummy - Male 
Seating condition was found to have a significant effect of the time taken by 
participants to operate the Type III exit (F 2,72 ý 11.74, p=0.0001). The mean exit 
operation times shown in table nine and independent t-tests suggest that in the 
situation with an able bodied passenger seated adjacent to the exit for both the 
traditional and modified Type III exit, changes to the seating configuration adjacent to 
the exit did not significantly influence the time taken for participants to operate the 
exit and evacuate onto the wing (Table 11). However, when an incapacitated 
passenger was seated adjacent to the exit for both the traditional and modified exit 
mechanisms, there was a significant increase in the time taken by participants to C, 
operate the exit and evacuate onto the wing in comparison to when participants were 
sat in the seat adjacent to the exit (Table 12). 
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Traditional Modified 
Type III Type III 
Exit Exit 
Table 11 An independent West summary table for participant speed of exit 
operation across the two AN79 seating configurations 
N Mean S. D S. E t df Probability 
OSR 32 7.03 4.16 0.736 -0.49 62 0.6233 
13" vertical 32 7.57 4.57 0.807 
projection. No 
dummy present 
Table 12 An independent t-test summary table for participant speed of exit 
operation with and without a simulated incapacitated passenger 
N Mean S. D S. E df Probability 
13" vertical 
projection. No 
dummy present 
13" vertical 
proj ection. 
Dummy present 
32 7.57 4.57 0.807 -2.53 62 
32 11.41 7.25 1.282 
0.01 
6.2.5 The influence of participants gender on operation of the Type III exit 
The mean operation time of 7.63 seconds (standard deviation 4.89) for mate 
participants was significantly faster than the time of 9.72 seconds (standard deviation 
6.44) for female participants indicating that women found the operation of a Type III 
exit regardless of the type of mechanism more difficult (F,, 72 = 6.78 p=0.0 11). The 
mean times shown in Table 8 suggested that the differences 
between the operating 
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times for males and females were reduced for the modified Type III exit. Hovvever 
this difference failed to reach significance (F,, 72= 3.01 p=0.087). 
6.2.6 The influence of participants handedness on the operation of the Type III 
exit 
Table 13 below, clearly indicates that mean times for participants to operate either 
exit type, were not effected by an individuals handedness. Statistical treatment of the 
data supported this as the effect of handedness was found to have a non-significant 
result (FI, 72 = 1.62 p=0.207). 
Table 13 Mean times (in seconds) taken by participants from hand on 
handle to exit and evacuate onto the wing, indicating the effect of 
handedness of the participants (standard deviations are shown in 
parentheses). 
TEST ONE 
Outboard Seat 13" Vertical 13" Vertical Projection 
Removed Projection Dummy Present 
No Dummy Present 
Right Left Right Left Right Left 
Modified 3.93 3.99 4.04 4.34 7.19 7.15 
Type 111 (1.31) (1.12) (1.32) (1.65) (3.14) (3.65) 
Traditional 10.06 10.15 11.71 10.21 12.04 19.26 
Type 111 (3.53) (4.24) (4.98) (3.06) (6.53) (7.42) 
6.2.7 The influence of practice on the operation of the Type III exit. 
Table 14 below, shows the mean evacuation times for all three tests by each 
participant and the data can be seen graphically represented in Figure 11. 
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Table 14 Mean times (in seconds) taken by participants from hand on 
handle to operate the exit and evacuate onto the wing (standard 
deviations are shown in parentheses). 
ALL TESTS 
Outboard Seat removed 13" Vertical Projection 13" Vertical Projection 
No Dummy Dummy Present 
Mod. Trad. Mod. Trad. Mod. Trad. 
Type III Type III Type III Type III Type III Týpe III 
Test One 3 3.96 10.11 4.19 10.96 7.17 15.65 
(1.2) (3.77) (1.45) (4.07) (3). 29) (7.71) 
Test Two 3.54 10.91 33.9 5 10.54 5.14 13.09 
(0.74) (5.38) (1.27) (3.23 )) (1.91) (5.71) 
Test Three 3.31 9.41 3.4 8 9.92 4.99 11.67 
(0.68) (2.83) (1.00) (3). 44) (2.02) (5.64) 
Figure 11 Graphical Representation of mean times (in seconds) to operate 
the exit and evacuate onto the wing. 
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A Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance was performed as this allowed the 
influence of practice on trial times to be assessed. Again, the main effect of door 
mechanism and seating configuration found in the analysis of participant Operation 
times across all of the tests was significant. 
Table 15 A Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance Summarý' Table for 
Between-subjects and Within-subject effect of practice, on the 
times taken by volunteers to operate the Type III exit and evacuate 
onto the wing. 
Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
squares 
F Probabilit% 
Seating condition 435.36 2 217.63 7.67 0,001 
Door type 3474.31 1 3474.31 122.5 0.0001 
S. condition by door type 20.71 2 10.35 
I 
0.37 0.695 
Within + residual error 2552.38 90 28.36 
Practice 114.34 2 57.17 9.87 0.0001 
Seating condition by practice 75.25 4 18.81 3.25 0.013 
Door type by practice 10.88 2 5.44 0.94 0.393 
S. condition by door type by 11.50 4 2.87 0.50 0.738 
practice 
Within + residual error 1042.60 180 5.79 
The repeated measures ANOVA indicated that overall the effect of practice, in the 
majority of cases, led to a decrease in mean evacuation time and improved 
performance (F2,180 =: 9.87 P=0.0001). 
The increase in mean operation time in test two taken by participants operating the 
traditional Type III exit when the outboard seat was removed can be explained by the 
increase in the number of participants trying to correctly dispose of the exit hatch onto 
the wing of the cabin simulator. 
Table 15 also indicated a significant two-way interaction effect between the seating 
condition and practice. The univariate tests shown in Tables 16 and 17 indicate that 
the benefit of practice and participant learning is highest betvveen tests one and tvvo. 
The benefit of practice is highest for those individuals vvho were required to operate 
the exit in the presence of an incapacitated person or dummy. 
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Table 16 Univariate t-tests seating condition by practice, test one versus two 
I coefficient Standard error t probabilit% 
OSR Vs 13" no dummy 0.37 0.62 0.59 0.55 
13" no dummy Vs 13" dummy -1.39 0.62 -2.26 0.026 
Table 17 Univariate t-tests seating condition by practice, tests one and two 
versus three 
coefficient Standard error t probability 
OSR Vs 13" no dummy -0.48 0.59 -0.08 0.91) 
13" no dummy Vs 13" dummy -0.99 0.59 -1.69 0.09 
6.2.8 Placement of exit and the effect of practice 
Figure 12 below shows the number of participants correctly disposing of the exit 
hatch for both designs of Type III exit mechanism. In order for the exit hatch to have 
been 'correctly disposed' the traditional exit hatch had to be placed out onto the wing 
and the modified exit hatch had to be pushed fully up into the fuselage. Figure 12 
clearly shows that the numbers of participants correctly disposing of the exit hatch in 
the first test, were greater with the modified exit (94% as opposed to 40% with the 
traditional exit). The number of participants correctly disposing of the traditional exit 
hatch did increase in tests two and three, however 29% were still leaving the exit 
inside the aircraft in test three. Between each of the tests participants were NOT 
provided with information about the correct disposal of the exit from the cabin crew. 
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All of the participants in the modified Type III exit group who failed to dispose of the 
exit correctly, had not gained enough momentum to push the exit fully up into the 
fuselage. This however, did not pose a problem for them when they evacuated onto 
the wing. Table 18 below shows where the participants using the traditional Type III 
exit left the exit hatch inside the aircraft cabin, when failing to jettison it through the 
exit aperture. 
Table 18 Placement of hatch by participants using the traditional Type III 
Correct disposal of the Type III exit and the effects of practice 
Modified 
Type III exi 
Traditional 
Type III exi 
Trial One 
exit in Trials One, Two and Three (figures indicate the number of 
participants placing hatch in each location) 
Trial One Trial Two Trial Three 
On floor in exit row 
On seat in exit row D 4 4 
Across Dummy's lap 5 4 
Where the outboard seat had been 
removed 
8 5 
On the floor behind the exit row 
(in OSR condition) 
4 
Correct disposal onto it, ing 19 28 34 
OSR - Outboird seat removed 
0--, 69 
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Trial Pvo Trial Three 
6.2.9 Participants perceived ease of operation and the effect of practice 
Participants were asked to rate subjectively (on a seven point scale with 1 indicating 
ývery easy' and 7 indicating 'very difficult') the difficulty of various actions which 
were related to the operation of the Type III exit. Statistical analysis %vas used to 
assess the degree to which the perceived level of difficulty changed during the three 
trials that participants carried out. Regardless of the design of the exit, with practice, 
participant's ratings for the ease of using the operating handle, clarity of exit 
operating instructions, opening the exit and clarity of instructions for disposing of the 
exit hatch all became significantly lower. This indicates that participants perceived 
these to become easier over the three trials (F=3.48 df 2,178 P=0.033, F=6.90 df 
2,178 p=0.001, F=3.09 df 2,178 p=0.048 and F=24.95 df 2,178 p=0.0001 
respectively). Participants ratings for the weight and size of the exit and exiting on to 
the wing did not change significantly during the three trials. 
6.2.10 Problems experienced by participants in operating the type III exit and 
the effects of practice 
The percentage of participants reporting difficulties in operating the Type III exit was 
far greater with the traditional exit mechanism than with the modified exit 
mechanism. During trial one, 31% of those participants operating the modified exit 
experienced some difficulties in comparison to 88% of those participants operating 
the traditional Type III exit. Tables 19 and 20 below show the difficulties 
experienced by participants during the three trials for the modified and traditional 
Type III exits respectively. 
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Table 19 Problems experienced by participants in operating the modified 
Type III exit mechanism during the three trials (figures indicate 
percentage of participants experiencing each difficulty) 
Trial One Trial Two Trial Three 
Size of Type III exit aperture 25 25 1, 
Stepping over exit ledge 8.3 8.3 8.33 
Hit head on exit 2.1 4.2 
Unsure where to put exit 8.3) 2.1 
Exit didn't retract all the way into fuselage 2.1 4.2 6.25 
ummy obstructed participant in some way* 6.25 12.5 12.5 
Seats were in the way - - 21 
t`---ýý --l ýj Im - Vul-IiJaIlL3 III Lll%;; UUILIlIlY PIUSCHL MalS 
Table 19 shows the frequency with which problems were occurring with the modified 
exit mechanism. Problems such as the size of the exit aperture and stepping over the 
exit ledge onto the wing, remained stable with practice and did not effect the initial 
operation or disposal of the exit itself. During the three trials the number of 
participants reporting that they did not translate the exit fully in to the fuselage 
increased. The participants explained that due to the ease of the first operation they 
had not opened the exit with the same amount of force in the subsequent trials, this 
led to their difficulties in movement of the exit hatch into the fuselage. 
Table 20 Problems experienced by participants in operating the traditional 
Type III exit during the three trials (figures indicate percentage of 
participants experiencing each difficulty) 
Trial One Trial Two Trial Three 
Size of exit hatch and therefore the disposal 3 . 37.5 
58.3 58.33 
Unsure where to put exit hatch 16.6 10.42 2.1 
Seats were in the way 8.3 4.2 12.5 
Surprise of weight and exit hatch coming free 16.6 6.25 - 
Stepping over exit ledge 2.1 - 2.1 
Exit hatch hit their head 2.1 2.1 2.1 
Dummy obstructed participant in some way* 12.5 18.75 
*percentage refers only to 16 participants with the dummy present 
Table 20 clearly shows the problem participants experienced with the size of the exit 
hatch and consequently its disposal. The frequenc-v of this problem increased as 
participants practised opening the traditional Type III exit. This increase ývas 
accompanied by a decrease in the number of participants who were unsure where to 
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put the exit hatch. Figure 12 above, clearly shows that as participants practised 
opening the exit there was an increase in the probability of a correct disposal of the 
traditional Type III exit and therefore a similar increase in those participants 
encountering difficulty in trying to place the exit hatch onto the wing. 
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6.3 Discussion 
6.3.1 Evaluation of test methodologies 
The research programme illustrated many of the difficulties that members of the 
public can have in operating Type III exits. The participants were not briefed about 
the exact nature of the test prior to taking part, so the experimental situation simulated 
the ambiguity which may occur in an emergency. 
The differences in the mean operation and evacuation times from previous Type III 
exit tests may have been due to such factors as improvements to the Type III exit 
operation diagrams or improved realism in the aircraft cabin simulator. 
The participants were also advised that passenger safety briefing cards in the seat 
pockets and safety placards on the seat backs in front of them detailed how the exit 
operated. This instruction may have led to an increased awareness on the part of 
participants leading them to study the safety card and/or placard in more detail. 
However, this result should not be taken to indicate that all passengers would be 
equally prepared in an aircraft emergency, indeed a few participants during the 
research programme initially started to move towards the exits at the rear of the cabin 
as they believed that cabin crew would be stationed there and that these exits would 
be easier to evacuate from, thus disregarded the instructions given to them in the pre- 
flight briefing. 
As a result of methodological considerations all of the tests were carried out on an 
individual basis without the pressure from other passengers trying to escape. In this 
event it is hypothesised that the manoeuvre of the traditional exit may indeed be made 
even more difficult than the results indicated. 
6.3.2 The influence of the Type III exit operation mechanism 
The mean evacuation time for each participant on the first test, regardless of seating 
configuration, clearly indicated that the modifications to the Type III exit operating 
mechanism significantly increased the speed at which participants could open the exit 
and evacuate onto the wing of the simulator. The difficulties participants found in 
manoeuvring and disposing of the exit due to its size and weight were remo,.,, ed or 
lessened when operating the modified exit mechanism. This finding demonstrates the 
benefits which could be gained from the adoption of the modified Type III exit 
mechanism. particular during evacuations when passengers are pushing to escape. 
6.3.3 The influence of seating configuration on the operation of the Type III 
exit 
The evacuation times from both types of exit mechanisms showed that the seating 
configuration did not affect the speed at which participants opened the exit and 
evacuated onto the wing. Due to methodological considerations the test did not 
involve other participants competing to escape and as a result. operation difficulties 
reported with the outboard seat configuration could not be assessed. 
Exit operation times were significantly slower when a dummy representing an 
incapacitated passenger was present. Participants found that their access to the exit 
was restricted and therefore the operation of the exit more difficult. The restricted 
space caused by the presence of the dummy was a particular hindrance when 
participants were trying to dispose of the traditional Type III exit. In some cases as 
the participant tried to manoeuvre the exit through the exit aperture 
it became wedged 
against the dummy and seat row in front. Due to the weight and size of the exit 
hatch 
they decided to leave the exit lying across the dummy's lap rather than continuing 
in 
their efforts to place the exit onto the -wing. 
74 
6.3.4 The influence of participants gender on the operation of the Type III exit 
Male participants operated the Type III exit significantly quicker than female 
participants. Women found the operation of both Type III exit mechanisms more 
difficult than male participants, although the mean evacuation times suggested that 
these differences were reduced when participants were operating the modified exit 
mechanism. It appeared that the female participants who found the size and ý'veight of 
the traditional exit particularly difficult to manage were not at such a disadvantage 
when operating the modified exit mechanism. This mechanism did not require them 
to support and manoeuvre the heavy exit, a task which the female participants had 
found particularly difficult. The results of changes in exit mechanism on male and 
female participants ability to operate a Type III exit suggest that the benefits of 
adopting the modified design of Type III mechanism would be greater for female 
passengers. 
The adoption of the modified exit mechanism would ease the problems that check in 
staff face when deciding on who should be seated in this area. Whilst they have strict 
rules about individuals who should not be seated next to the exit it can be a very 
subjective assessment of whether and individual is 'capable' of operating the exit. 
The adoption of the modified type III exit mechanism would ensure that a greater 
range of passengers really are 'capable' of successfully operating such a class of exits. 
6.3.5 The influence of participants handedness on the operation of the Type III 
exit 
The mean times taken to operate both exit mechanisms showed that an individuals 
handedness did not affect their ability to operate a Type III exit. 
6.3.6 The influence of practice on the operation of the Type III exit 
Practising the task three times significantly reduced the times taken by the 
participants to operate the exit and evacuate onto the wing. 
The effects of practice 
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between the two exit mechanisms "-ere not found to be significantly different. 
however the benefits of reduction in evacuation times appeared to be greater ývjth the 
traditional exit mechanism. This result indicates quite clearl-y the benefits that 
passengers could gain from being provided with the opportunity to use equipment in a 
safety centre. Their performance improved through practice e-,,, en xvithout any 
training input from the researcher. It is suggested that correct disposal of the 
traditional Type III hatch would have been even greater after trial three had 
instruction been provided between each attempt. 
Although practising the operation of the traditional Type III exit mechanism 
improved participants ability to operate the exit, it failed to the increase it to the speed 
of operation of the modified exit mechanism. This result suggests that if such 
modifications to these exits were introduced onto current aircraft they could reduce 
the need for hands on training in safety centres 
The reduction in operating time and benefits due to practice were greatest when the 
dummy was present. This demonstrates the effect an incapacitated person could have 
on an evacuation of this type and the importance of including this configuration in 
future testing. 
6.3.7 Placement of exit and the effect of practice 
The number of participants correctly disposing of the Type III exit was greater in all 
three trials when participants were operating the modified exit mechanism in 
comparison to the tradition exit mechanism. In the first test only 40% participants 
correctly disposed of the traditional exit correctly where as 94% participants 
fully 
pushed the modified exit up into the fuselage. The numbers of participants correctly 
disposing of the traditional Type III exit did increase in tests two and three, however 
29% were still leaving the exit inside the aircraft in test three. 
7 () 
The participants who failed to dispose of the traditional Type III exit onto the Nvincy 
did so because they found that either the size and weight of the exit "vas too difficult 
to manoeuvre or because they failed to understand the diagrams on the passenger 
safety briefing cards and placards. Many of the participants felt that improvements 
could be made to the diagrams indicating the operation of the traditional Type III exit 
for example they felt that the pictures could be clarified, showing exactly where to 
place the exit. They also commented that it would be useful to give an indication of 
the weight of the exit and to verbally explain how to use the exit. 
This result demonstrates the difficulty that participants can experience when operating 
the Traditional Type III exit. The failure to correctly dispose of the traditional Type 
III exit could lead to it becoming an obstruction to passengers in their attempt to 
evacuate from an exit of this type. As the testing showed, the modified exit removed 
the problem of passengers leaving the exit inside the aircraft and therefore creating 
any subsequent obstruction. Even when participants had failed to read or were not 
clear about the operating instructions for the modified exit, when they released the 
operating handle, the movement of the exit encouraged them to correctly push it up 
into the fuselage. 
6.3.8 Participants perceived ease of operation and the effect of practice 
Participants subjective ratings indicated that regardless of type III exit operation 
mechanism, with practice they felt that the ease of using the operating handle, clarity 
of exit instructions, opening the exit and clarity for disposing the exit all became 
easier. This suggests that the diagrams used in this study became easier to understand 
with practice and the information they impart could in fact be clarified and improved. 
The participants subjective ratings for the weight and size of the exit and exiting on to 
the wing did not change significantly during the three trials, indicating that the 
difficulty of these factors remained constant. 
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6.3.9 Problems experienced by participants in operating the Type III exit and 
the effect of practice 
The percentage of participants reporting difficulties in operating the Type III exit was 
far greater with the traditional Type III exit mechanism than with the modified exit 
mechanism. The type of difficulties encountered by participants were dependent on 
the exit mechanism being used. In the traditional Type III exit trials more participants 
reported difficulties pertaining to the operation and disposal of the exit. In 
comparison, difficulties reported in the modified Type III exit trials were linked to the 
size of the exit aperture and height of the exit ledge, which caused problems -ý'vhen 
participants were evacuating onto the wing. 
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6.4 Conclusions 
I. The present Type III exits provided on current aircraft have a number of short- 
comings, including weight and manoeuvrability which have led to problems in 
the operation of the exit. 
2. The short-comings of the traditional Type III exit may. be best overcome by 
provision of a system of support and constraint which aids the operation of 
removing te hatch from the aperture in the limited space around it. 
3. The modified exit uses the same motion principles as the main doors on a 
number of aircraft. This concept provides a relatively simple scheme which 
does not require substantial fuselage modification or loss of seating capacity. 
4. The time taken by participants to operate a Type III exit and evacuate onto the 
wing of a simulator was significantly quicker when using the modified Type 
III exit mechanism. This Indicates need to simplify equipment to be used by 
untrained operators. 
5. The two seating configurations specified in AN79 paragraphs 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 
1989, did not significantly influence the time taken by participants to operate 
either type of Type III exit mechanism and evacuate onto the wing. Further 
research is required to assess the impact on ease of operation of the presence 
of other passengers, particularly with the outboard seat removed. 
6. The presence of the simulated incapacitated person seated adjacent to the Type 
III exit significantly increased the time taken by participants to make the exit 
available and evacuate onto the wincy 
7. Female participants found the operation of both types of Type III ex1t 
mechanism more difficult than male participants. The benefits of adopting the 
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modified Type III mechanism would be greater for females than for males and 
would ease the difficulties of those individuals -ývho are responsible for 
ensuring passengers seated next to the exit really are 'capable' of successfully 
operating these exits. 
8. Participants handedness did not affect participants ability to operate either 
Type III exit mechanism. 
9. Providing participants with the opportunity to practice the task three times led 
to a reduction in the times taken to operate both types of Type III exit 
mechanisms and evacuate onto the wing. The greatest learning occurred 
between test one and two. This result indicates the benefits passengers could 
gain from visiting safety centres. 
10. Practising the operation of the traditional Type III exit failed to improve 
participants speed of operation to the speed achieved by participants when 
operating the modified Type III exit without practice. The introduction of 
such modifications to these exits onto current aircraft could reduce the need 
for hands on training of Type III exit operation in safety centres. 
11. The effect of practice was greatest in conditions with the dummy present. 
12. Practice provided participants with the opportunity to find more effective 
methods of opening and manoeuvring the traditional Type III exit. Practice 
also led to a greater number of participants correctly disposing of the 
traditional Type III exit. 
13. The difficulties that naive participants encountered in trying to understand the 
exit operating instructions of the traditional Type III exit indicated the need to 
clearly indicate the method of operation and disposal of such exits. 
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7 EXPERIMENT TWO: MODE OF INSTRUCTION 
7.1 Research Design 
The tests were conducted on a B-737 simulator configured to the current regulations. 
Each test involved an individual participant performing a safevy related task (donning 
life jacket) before operating a Type III exit and evacuating on to the wing of the cabin 
simulator. The use of this safety task was done so to provide a blocking task bet,, ý-een 
the safety information and exit operation. The Type III exit hatch ý, velghed 21.5 k-a 
and all of the trials were conducted with a triple row of seats with a 13"' vertical 
projection (see Appendix C). 
In total, 56 volunteers operated a Type III exit, 8 volunteers in each of the seven 
safety information conditions. In each of the conditions participants were given a pre 
flight safety briefing followed by an additional safety briefing (Appendix 1) informing 
them that they were sat next to an emergency exit and may have to operate it in the 
event of an emergency. Participants were then either directed to look at the briefing 
card (Appendix J), given a verbal description of how to operate the exit (Appendix K) 
or shown a video (Appendix L), depending on the experimental condition they were 
in. Table 21 shows the experimental conditions and volunteers utilised. 
Table 21 The experimental test conditions 
Condition Male Female 
1) no briefing card 4 4 
2i) colour pictures with operator (Pic operator) 4 4 
2ii) colour picture without operator (Pic) 4 4 
2iii) colour photograph with operator (Photo) 4 4 
2iv) colour picture and words (words) 4 4 
3) verbal description no briefing cara (verbal) 4 4 
4) video no briefing card (video) 4 4 
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1.1 Ethical considerations 
The research design was submitted to the Cranfield Ethics committee. As -'xith study 
one the ethical considerations of confidentiality of data, safety and v'-elfare of I 
participants, voluntary participation and knowledge of results were adhered to in this 
research programme. 
7.1.2 Methodological considerations 
As with study one there is a need to balance the need for realism with the safety of the 
participants. The Type III operation trials involved individual participants for several 
reasons; firstly it was felt that the risk of injury to other participants precluded group 
trials. secondly, in order to produce pressure in the exit area a large number of 
participants or confederates would be required, over the course of the experimental 
programme the cost and practicalities negated such a design. Thirdly and more 
importantly, the study aimed to make an assessment of the impact that briefing 
material alone had on exit operator performance. Should other passengers or 
confederates been present during the tests the operator may have relied upon them to 
help them. Such behaviour has been reported in earlier testing (Sibley, 1995) when 
passengers attempted to evacuate from the main exits because cabin crew members 
were stationed there rather than assuming responsibility for the operation of the Type 
III exit. 
7.1.3 Equipment 
1.3.1 The cabin mock-up 
The experimental tests took place in the same simulator used during experiment one. 
Ten rows of triple seats were located along either side of the cabin fuselage. A fully 
functioning Type III exit was fitted half way down the side of the fuselage. The triple 
seat configuration forming the exit aisle the seats fore and aft of the 
Type III exit vvere 
S2 
at a seat pitch of approximately 38 inches (97 cm) with a vertical projection between 
the seats of 13 inches (33 cm) This vertical projection was used so the exit seat ro,,, ý- 
did not extend beyond the exit centre line thus complying with paragraph 4.1.1 in 
AN79 (see Appendix B). 
7.1.3.2 Type III Exits 
The dimensions of exit hatch in the cabin simulator were representative of those on a 
narrow bodied transport aircraft and the same used for the 'traditional' exit in 
experiment one. 
7.1.4 Data Acquisition 
Video cameras were located inside and outside the cabin, in order to record the 
manner in which participants opened and disposed of the Type III exit. The cameras 
were fitted with a time base function and microphones to provide the information 
required for the data analysis. 
A questionnaire was used to identify any problems experienced by participants when 
opening the exit and evacuating onto the wing. In this questionnaire participants were 
asked to assess the ease with which they considered they were able to open the exit 
and evacuate from the cabin and to indicate the nature of any difficulties experienced 
in completing the task (see Appendix K). 
7.1.5 Participants 
The volunteers were recruited by local advertising and use of the Human Factors 
Group's data base. In order for the volunteers to be representative of those who were 
expected to encounter most difficulties in completing the task, the same maximum 
height and weight criteria used for recruitment during experiment one were emplo-ved I 
, experiment 
two. during 
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Volunteers who had taken part in previous Type III tests were not eligible to take part 
in the test programme. The volunteers were only allowed to take part on one 
occasion. 
7.1.6 Test Procedure 
The volunteers were randomly assigned to one of the seven experimental conditions. 
A member of the research team, trained and dressed as a cabin crew member briefed 
each participant about the nature of the test upon his/her arrival at the College of 
Aeronautics. In order to maximise realism the participants were not briefed about the 
precise nature of the test but were forewarned that they would be carrying out various 
safety procedures and they might have to lift a weight equivalent to that of a heavy 
suitcase (potential volunteers with health problems were screened out during 
recruitment). Participants were asked to complete a consent form indicating that they 
understood the general nature of the study and that they believed they were physically 
able to take part in the test. 
Once seated inside the cabin, each participant was given a pre-flight safety briefing 
which included a demonstration of the method of operation of the seat belt, oxygen 
mask, life jacket as well as the location of the Type III and other exits (see appendix 
1). Following the participant was informed that they were sat next to an emergency 
exit and that should there be a need to evacuate the aircraft that they may have to 
operate the exit. This additional briefing was followed by one of the experimental 
conditions. 
The cabin crew member then checked that the participants' seat belt was fastened 
securely and positioned herself at the front of the cabin. The participant then heard a 
sound recording of an aircraft starting up, taxiing to a runway and taking off before 
being issued with the instruction to don his/her life jacket before being instructed to 
'Open the exit and get out'. The test continued until the participant successfully I 
opened the exit hatch (and disposed of it) and e-vacuated onto the. After the test the 
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participant completed a questionnaire commenting on various aspects of the safety 
briefing, their evacuation and their attitudes to aircraft safety briefings etc. (see 
Appendix K). 
Before leaving cranfield each participant was given a debriefing in which they were I 
be reminded of the safety of air travel and advised that they should get back in touch 
with Cranfield if they experienced any physical or emotional problems as a result of 
participating in the tests. 
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7.2 RES UL TS 
7.2.1 Individual characteristics of the participants 
The mean age of all of the participants was 27.25 years (the youngest being 20, the 
oldest 44 years old). The male participants had a mean height andweight of 173 -) cm 
and 69.25kg. The female participants had a mean height and weight of 163) cm and 
60.5kg respectively. The average frequency of exercise taken by participants was one 
or two times a week. All but one participant had flown before and the average 
number of flights taken was 11-15 return flights. Eighty three percent of the 
participants had flown within the last year. 
7.2.2 Donning of the Lifejacket 
All of the participants were given a pre-flight briefing which included a demonstration 
by the cabin crew showing how to don the lifejacket. The time taken to don the 
lifejacket was taken from the instruction "put on your life-jacket" (time 0.00) to when 
the participant had finished their attempt to put on the life jacket. 
A total of 9 participants had to be given extra information about the stowage of the 
life-jacket which was located beneath their seat. The average time taken by 
participants to don their life-jacket was 49.12 seconds (10.76 SD). The shortest time 
taken to don a life-jacket was 29.60 seconds the longest was 76.47. Seventy one 
percent of participants correctly donned their life-jacket, those that did not, had tied 
the tapes across the life-jacket itself making inflation difficult. 
Twenty three percent of participants undid their seat belt to put on their life-jacket, 
even after specific instructions to remain seated with their seatbelt on. A further four 
percent stood up while putting on their life-jacket. Several participants commented 
that whilst they had been shown how to put on their life-jacket, the demonstration was 
cy gliven bý, the cabin crexv member whilst standin,,,. Consequently xvhen they ývere 
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asked to put on their life-jacket they were unclear whether they should initially stand 
and then found that the demonstration they had seen was in fact of little help. 
7.2.3 The operation of the Type III exit 
Table 22 shows the mean times (in seconds) by all of the participants to make the exit 
a-yailable. This time was calculated from the point at which their hand was on the 
operating handle to when the exit was available i. e. the exit was on the wing or had 
been deposited in the cabin. Table 22 also includes the time taken by participants to 
operate the exit and evacuate onto the wing This time was taken from the point at 
which their hand was on the operating handle to when they had one foot on the wing. 
As Table 22 shows participants who were shown the video made the exit available 
quicker and exited on to the wing more quickly than any of the other groups. 
Table 22 Mean times (in seconds) taken by all participants to make the exit 
available and from hand on handle to exit and evacuate onto the 
wing (standard deviations are shown in parentheses). 
Time in seconds to make the Time in seconds from hand on 
exit available handle to exit onto the wing 
Nothing 10.76 14.21 
(6.12) (6.03) 
B/Card Pic operator 10.89 14.76 
(3.45) (5.00) 
B/Card Pic 9.90 12.49 
(2.99) (3.54) 
B/Card Photo 13.97 17.50 
(10.86) (10.45) 
B/Card Words 12.57 16.33 
(4.46) (3.92) 
Verbal Description 11.52 15.51 
(4.91) (6.94) 
Video 7.75 11.82 
(3.28) (5.65) 
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Due to differences in the numbers of participants correctly disposing of the exit onto 
the wing Table 23 shows the mean times taken by participants who correctly disposed 
of the exit. Figure 13 graphically represents this information. 
Table 23 Mean times (in seconds) taken by those participants correctly 
disposing of the exit - exit available (standard deviations are shown 
in parentheses). 
Time in seconds Number of paxs correctly 
disposing of exit 
Nothing - 0 
B/Card Pic operator 11.76 4 
(3.90) 
B/Card Pic 8.44 5 
(2.74) 
B/Card Photo 13.26 1 
(0.00) 
B/Card Words 13.62 5 
(4.32) 
Verbal Description 11.31 6 
(3.26) 
Video 7.75 8 
(3.28) 
8 
Figure 13 Graphical depiction of Mean times (in seconds) taken bv those 
participants correctly disposinc, of the exit - exit available. 
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There was no significant difference in the time taken by participants to make the exit 
available as a result of the exit operation information they were given, the one-way 
ANOVA summary is shown in Table 24. 
Table 24 One-way Anova Summary table - Time to make exit available by 
briefing condition 
D. F Sums of squares Mean squares F Probability 
Between Groups 5 147.85 29.57 2.44 0.065 
Within Groups 23 278.52 12.10 
Total 28 426.37 
As Table 23 shows the quickest times were recorded by those participants who had 
been shown the video presentation. All of these participants correctly disposed of the 
exit. The simplified briefing card without an operator also led to quick operating 
times ho\, ý-cver fewer participants correctly disposed of the exit. The slowest times 
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0-1 
were recorded by participants who had been shown the photograph and pictures with 
additional words briefing cards. The briefing card with safety information depicted in 
photographs not only led to slow operation times, but only one participant correctlv 
disposed of the hatch. All of the participants who did not receive any information 
about the operation of the Type III exit failed to correctly dispose of the exit. 
Table 25 below shows the mean time taken by participants who correctly operated the 
exit to do so and evacuate onto the wing, this information is graphically represented in 
Figure 14. 
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Table 25 Mean times (in seconds) taken by those participants correcth, 
disposing of the exit - hand on handle to exiting onto the wing 
(standard deviations are shown in parentheses). 
Time in seconds Number of paxs correctly 
disposing of exit 
Nothing - 0 
B/Card Pic operator 14.46 4 
(5.75) 
B/Card Pic 10.48 5 
(2.83) 
B/Card Photo 16.34 1 
(0) 
B/Card Words 17.28 5 
(4.34) 
Verbal Description 15.65 6 
(5.98) 
Video 11.82 8 
(5.65) 
Figure 14 Graphical representation of the Mean times (in seconds) taken by 
those participants correctly disposing of the exit - hand on handle to 
exiting onto the wing. 
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As Table 26 indicates there were no significant differences in the times taken to 
operate and evacuate onto the wing between the groups. Again the quickest times 
were recorded by those individuals in the simplified exit diagrams without an operator 
and video groups. The slowest times were recorded by those individuals who ýý-ere 
shown exit operation information presented in pictures with additional words. 
Table 26 One-way Anova Summary table - Time to operate the exit and 
evacuate onto the wing 
D. F Sums of squares Mean squares F Probability 
Between Groups 5 175.51 35.10 1.32 0.288 
Within Groups 23 608.54 26.45 
Total 28 784.04 
7.2.4 Position of operation 
Table 27 below shows the position participants operated the Type III exit. As the 
table indicates the majority of the participants operated the exit from a standing 
position. The reason they gave for doing this was because they felt it was more 
appropriate and that they could support the weight of the exit. However, seventy five 
percent of the participants who watched the video operated the exit from a seated 
position. Four of the participants said that they did this because the video had shown 
a person operating the exit from a seated position the other two felt that it was more 
appropriate to remain seated. 
Table 27 Position of participants during operation of the Type III exit 
Seated Standing 
Nothing 2 6 
B/Card Pic operator 1 7 
B/Card Pic 1 7 
B/Card Photo 1 7 
B/Card Words 1 7 
Verbal Description 1 7 
Video 6 
7.2.5 Disposal of the Type III exit 
In total fifty two percent of the participants disposed of the Type III exit correctly 
onto the wing. Figure 15 below shows the number of participants in each condition 
who correctly disposed of the exit. 
Figure 15 Number of participants correctly disposin-, c,, of the exit 
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Statistical analysis showed that mode of information presentation had a significant 
effect on the number of participants correctly disposing of the exit (Z 25 =23.45, 
p=<0.0006). As figure 15 shows when participants received no instructions about 
operating the exit and did not have a briefing card none of them correctly disposed of 
the exit. The photographic exit diagrams appear to be particularly poor in conveying 
to participants where they should dispose of the exit. All of the participants who were 
shown the video correctly disposed of the exit. 
Figure 16 shows where participants disposed of the exit. 
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As figure 16 clearly shows, all of the participants who were shown the video correctly 
disposed of the exit. Six participants who received verbal instruction disposed of the 
exit correctly. These results indicate that by showing participants or specifically 
telling them to place the exit onto the wing correct disposal of the exit increases. 
Most of the individuals who failed to dispose of the exit correctly operated the exit 
handle and simply let the exit drop to the floor on its side. A few individuals didn't 
realise that the exit had to be placed on the wing and placed it upright against the seats 
in front. 
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7.2.6 Questionnaire information 
7.2.6.1 Pre-flight safety briefing 
Ninety one percent of the participants paid attention to the Pre-flight safety briefing. 
when asked if it helped them in their escape all but two felt that it had. Table 28 
below shows how the participants felt., that the pre-flight safety briefing had helped 
them. The two participants who felt that the infonnation in the Pre-flight briefing was 
unhelpful did so because the life-jacket demonstration had shown the cabin creNv 
member putting the life-jacket on whilst standing. 
Table 28 How did the Pre-flight safety briefing aid your escape? 
Percentage 
Showed how to put on your life-jacket 54 
Knew exactly what to do 25 
Knew how to operate the emergency exit 14 
Knew where the exits were 7 
7.2.6 2 Additional safety briefing 
Ninety six percent of the participants listened to the additional safety briefing advising 
them that they were sat next to the emergency exit. Seventy five percent of these 
participants felt that the additional safety briefing had been helpful because they knew 
it was their responsibility to operate the exit and as a consequence paid attention to 
any additional exit infonnation.. 
7.2.6.3 Safety Card 
Of the thirty two participants who had a briefing card seventy five percent carefully 
looked at the card. Table 29 below shows how the participants felt that the briefing 
cards had been helpful. Only one of the participants felt that the card had been 
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unhelpful; reporting that felt that the pictorial briefing card without an operator wasn't 
clear in showing where the door should go. 
Table 29 How did the safety card aid your escape? 
Percent 
Showed how to open the exit 821 
Provided more information on the life-jacket 12 
1 knew to put the life jacket on seated 6 
7.2.6.4 Exit diagram 
The majority of participants who had a briefing card read the exit operation 
instructions carefully (92%). Figure 17 below shows the number of individuals who 
felt that the diagrams had helped them in their operation of the exit. 
Figure 17 Number of participants who felt that the exit diagram on the 
briefing card was helpful 
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7.2.6.5 Verbal instructions 
Those individuals who were given verbal instructions detailing ho", to operate the exit 
all felt that this had been helpful and aided them in the operation of the TN,. pe III exit. 
When they were asked how the instructions had helped, the majority of the 
participants (6) said that they knew exactly how to open and dispose of the exit . The 
two participants who felt that the verbal briefing had not prepared them to operate the 
exit said that it provided them with information however they were still unclear about 
the operation of the exit. 
7.2.6.6 Video 
The participants who were shown the video detailing how to operate the exit all said 
that it had aided their escape. They all stated that the video had clearly shown the 
exact steps necessary to operate and dispose of the exit. 
7.2.6.7 Most preferred method ofpresentation of information 
Figure 18 below shows participants preferred method of presentation of safety 
information. 'Preferred' simply means which of the safety information they had been 
given proved to be most useful in the operation of the exit and as a consequence they 
would choose to help them in their performance of the task. 
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Participants who had received no exit information felt that the additional safety 
briefing infonning them that they were seated next to an exit and that it was their 
responsibility to operate it had been more useful than the pre-flight safety briefing. 
This was because it had captured their attention as it was very personal. 
Those participants who had a briefing card to look at, predominantly felt that this had 
provided them with the best information as it provided them with a visual depiction of 
how to operate the exit and showed what to pull and where to hold the exit. Those 
participants who felt that the additional safety briefing had been the most beneficial 
commented again that this had been very personal and they had listened carefully to 
the instructions they were given, once they realised that it was their responsibility to 
operate the exit they then read the briefing card carefully. 
All of the participants who received verbal instructions and responded to this question 
felt that it was indeed these instructions which had provided them with the most 
useful information. Again as it was a one to one presentation so as a result they felt 
compelled to listen to the verbal description. A couple of participants commented 
98 
Additional S. B Safctý card Verbal 
after the test that they had felt it hard to visualise exactly what theý, had to do %vithout 
a diagram to look at as well. 
All of the participants who were shown the video felt that this o, -as the best method of 
safety information that they were given. They stated that it captured their attention 
and showed clearly how to open and dispose of the exit. It %,,, -as a real life 
demonstration which was better than pictures as it was dynamic. Having ýý,, atch 
another 'passenger' operate the exit they were then able to mentally rehearse the 
actions that they had to take. 
7.2.6.8 Operation of the exit 
Participants were asked to rate various aspects of the operation of the exit on a seven 
point scale; I indicating very easy, 7 indicating very difficult. Eighty percent of the 
participants rated the location of the exit in relation to their seat as very easy. Eighty 
two percent felt that finding the operating handle had also been very easy. There were 
no significant differences between mode of presentation group and participants ratings 
of opening, disposing and exiting onto the wing. However, as figure 19 shows those 
participants who were shown the video, on average rated opening and disposing the 
exit as easier than all of the other groups. 
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Table 30 
Average difficulty rating of opening , disposing and exiting on to 
the wing 
* Nothing 
* Card photo 
a Video 
(U Card pic op C] Card pic 
a Card words E3 Verbal 
One-way Anova Summary table - Mean difficulty of opening rating 
by briefing condition 
D. F Sums of squares- Mean squares F Probability 
Between Groups 6 7.17 1.19 0.76 0.61 
Within Groups 49 76.75 1.56 
Total 55 83.92 
Table 31 One-way Anova Summary table - Mean difficulty of disposal by 
briefing condition 
D. F Sums of squares 
Between Groups 6 32.17 
Within Groups 49 125.37 
Total 55 157.55 
Table 32 One-way Anova Summary 
through the exit by briefing c 
Mean squares F Probability 
5.36 2.09 0.07 
2.55 
table - Mean difficulty of exiting 
ondition 
D. F Sums of squares Mean squares F Probability 
Between Groups 6 11.17 1.86 1. "-) 0.25 
"19 Within Groups 49 68.25 1.1 
Total 55 79.42 
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Opening Disposing Exiting 
As Figure 20 indicates, on average participants who were shown the video gave this 
mode of presentation a better rating for clarity of opening instructions than those 
participants who were given verbal instructions or briefing cards, although this result 
was not significant. Clarity of video disposing instructions were also given the best 
rating. Participants who were shown the photographic briefing card reported the 
opening and disposing instructions as less clear and this reflected in their accuracy 
and speed of performance. 
Figure 20 
7 
6 
5 
4 
a 
Average rating of the clarity of the opening and disposing 
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Table 33 One-way Anova Summary table - Mean clarity of operating 
instructions by briefing condition 
D. F Sums of squares Mean squares F Probability 
Between Groups 6 9.51 1.58 0.91 0.49 
Within Groups 40 69.03 1.72 
Total 46 78.55 
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ating Disposal 
instruction instructions 
Table 34 One-way Anova Summary table - mean clarity of disposal 
instructions by briefing condition 
D. F Sums of squares Mean squares F Probability 
Between Groups 6 38.26 6.37 1.22 0.31 
Within Groups 42 218.83 5.21 
Total 48 257.10 
7.2.6.9 Exit operating difficulties 
Table 35 shows the problems participants reported when using the overwing exit. 
Table 35 Participants report problems when operating the Type III exit 
Difficulty Number of participants 
Weight of the exit 17 
Manoeuvrability II 
Not knowing what to do with the exit 10 
Exit in the way due to placement inside 5 
Size of the exit 2 
Understanding operating instructions 2 
Door coming free 3 
Step I 
As Table 35 shows thirty six percent of participants commented that the weight of the 
exit caused them difficulty, twenty three percent of all of the participants felt that it 
would have been beneficial to have been warned about the weight of the exit. Several 
participants felt unclear about the placement of the exit and felt that advice about 
where to place it would have be beneficial. 
7.2.6.10 Perceived weight of the exit and time to operate the exit 
Participants were asked if the weight of the exit was heavier, less than or about the 
same weight as they had expected. As figure 21 below shows, the majority of 
participants said that the exit was indeed heavier than they expected, only fifteen 
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percent thought that the exit was lighter than they had expected. Forty six percent of 
the participants said that the operation of the Type III exit had taken them longer than 
they expected in comparison to twenty three percent who thought that it had taken less 
time than they expected. 
Figure 21 Perceived weight of the exit and time to operate the exit. 
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7.2.6.11 Attitudes towards safety 
In order to put into context passengers perceptions of the usefulness of safety 
briefings and assess whether their attention could be affected by their perception of 
survival chances in an emergency participants were asked to indicate the extent to 
which they agreed or disagreed with various statements. Participants response to the 
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Heavier Lighter Same Longer Less Same 
first statement "If I was unfortunate to be involved in an aircraft accident my chances 
of survival would be minimal" is shown in figure 22 . 
Figure 22 Participants perceived chance of survival in an aircraft accident 
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Fifty six percent of participants showed some level of disagreement with the statement I C) 
and thought that their chances of survival were greater than just "minimal". 
Seventeen percent neither agreed nor disagreed (mid point) with the statement. 
Twenty seven percent agreed with the statement and felt that their chances of 
surviving and accident would be minimal. 
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I Disagree 24567 Agree 
The next two statements asked the participants about their attitudes toward safety 
information. Again their were asked to indicate their agreement to the statement on a 
seven point scale. Figure 23 graphically depicts their responses. 
Figure 23 Attitudes towards safety information on board aircraft 
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The majority of participants (90%) showed some level of agreement that pre-flight 
safety briefings provided essential information and that passengers should read the 
safety cards carefully. This response is interesting because as Figure 24 shows only 
thirty one percent of the participants said that they always look at the pre-flight safety 
briefings and read the safety cards when they fly. Many participants during the 
debrief said that they realised after taking part in the test how important the safety 
information was and that they would listen to the briefings and look at the cards in the 
future. 
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I disagree 23567 aCYree 
Figure 24 Percentage of participants who watch the pre-flight safeq, briefings tn t! ) 
on board aircraft 
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7.2.6.12 Preferred briefing card 
Participants were shown nine different briefing cards depicting the operation of the 
Type III exit, these can be found in Appendix N. They were asked to chose the one 
that best depicted the operation of the Type III exit. Figure 25 shows the number of 
participants choosing each of the variations. 
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Never Occasionally Always 
Figure 25 Preferred briefing card 
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The preferred briefing card was card D. Card D was actually the photographic 
operating instructions used during the test programme. The participants who chose 
this briefing card preferred it as it was a photograph and it depicted "real life". As 
Table 21 and Figure 13 showed, participants who were shown this card took the 
longest to make the exit available and only one individual correctly disposed of the 
exit. These instructions also received the poorest ratings for clarity of opening and 
disposing instructions from test participants. 
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Number of participants 
7.3 DISCUSSION 
7.3.1 Donning of the Lifejacket 
Although the current research's focus was on the operation of the Type III exit it 
highlighted the difficulties participants have in donning their lifejackets. T, ýventy 
three percent of the participants undid their seat belt to put on their lifejacket and 
several stood up. Participants commented that they were confused about whether they 
should stand to don their life jacket as the cabin crew members had done so during the 
pre flight demonstration. The use of video or computer generated pre-flight 
demonstrations could alleviate such a problem as it would allow the life-jacket 
demonstration to be shown with someone seated. Such demonstrations could also 
make a clear indication of where the life jacket is stowed, many of the participants 
during the test had to be given extra help to find their life jacket. The difficulties that 
passengers exhibited in donning the lifejacket further supports the introduction of 
some form of interactive and hands on training in safety centres. 
7.3.2 The operation of the Type III exit. 
As in the trials carried out in study one, the research programme illustrated further the 
difficulties that members of the public can have in operating Type III exits with many 
failing to correctly operate and dispose of the exit. 
One of the difficulties when analysing a study such as this, is how much emphasis 
should be placed on speed of exit operation and how much on accuracy of exit 
operation. Passengers may make the 'exit available' quickly by pulling the operating 
handle and allowing the exit to fall to the floor however this 'incorrect' performance 
may be of hindrance to other passengers in the ensuing evacuation. Conversely, 
passengers may take longer to operate the exit because they correctly dispose of the 
hatch onto the wing, such an action may cause a delay in the start of the evacuation 
but the hatch itself will no longer be a hindrance to passengers inside the cabin. 
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The impact of mode of presentation on the speed and accuracy of passenger operation 
of the Type III exit will be discussed in two separate sections. 
7.3.2.1 Speed of operation 
There were no significant differences between operation and evacuation times 
between the mode of presentation groups, although the quickest times 'Vý-ere recorded 
by those participants who watched a video briefing. The results indicated that the 
speed at which an untrained operator can operate the Type III exit can not be 
significantly reduced as a result of a variation in the way in which they had been 
briefed. This result, supported by previous testing (Fennell & Muir 199-3) and study 
one, indicates that the operation of the current Type III exit mechanism is an 
inherently difficult task. As a consequence, untrained passengers find dealing with 
the hatch weight and manoeuvring the exit hatch very difficult and it appears that the 
operating descriptions tested in this study failed to convey enough pertinent 
information to improve the speed at which passengers could operate this class of exit. 
It is also worth noting that all of the trials were carried out on an individual basis 
without any other passengers pushing in an attempt to evacuate, in this instance 
operation times could be significantly longer. This is something which is worthy of 
further investigation. 
7.3.2.2 Accuracy of operation 
Unlike the speed of exit operation, significant differences were found between the 
numbers of participants disposing of the exit correctly as a result of the way in which 
they were briefed. 
The video instructions which dynamically showed the method of exit operation, better 
prepared participants to operate the exit. All of them correctly disposed of the exit on 
to the wing (8), significantly more than any other mode of presentat' These ion group. 
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findings demonstrate the benefits which could be gained from showing passengers a 
video demonstrating the operation of the Type III exit. Passengers in this group stated 
that by watching the video it had clearly shown the exact steps necessary to operate 
and dispose of the exit, it showed "real life" and had given them a chance to mentally 
rehearse the procedure they had to use. 
The participants who were not given any exit briefing material all failed to dispose of 
the exit hatch correctly. All of them pulled the handle and let the exit fall to the floor. 
The aim of this test group was to simulate those individuals who do not read the 
safety information. This result indicates the importance of highlighting to passengers 
seated in this area that they are responsible for the operation of the exit and that they 
must read the safety information, even if they have sat there on previous flights. 
Evidence from the participants' questionnaires suggest that the use of such a briefing 
could be very successful as the majority of the participants reported that the additional 
exit briefing had captured their attention making them aware that in an emergency it 
would be their responsibility to operate the exit. The also noted that as a result of the 
briefing if they had a briefing card they re-read the information on the exit operation. 
Only one individual in the photographic diagrams briefing group correctly disposed of 
the exit, it appeared that the photographs used did not adequately depict where the exit 
had to be placed. This result mirrors some of the findings carried out by Douglas, 
suggesting that pictures were better able to highlight certain features which 
photographs cannot. It would appear that the exit operating and disposal instructions 
were some how lost in the rich detailed photograph. All of the alternative briefing 
cards resulted in significantly more passengers correctly operating the exit and it is 
therefore suggested that photographs should not be used to depict procedural safety 
information. Interestingly, whilst this card resulted in the poorest Performance of 
those individuals who were shown this card, it was the preferred choice of participants 
when asked to chose the best briefing card from nine alternatives (see discussion 
section 7.3.3.4). 
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All three alternative briefing cards led to significantly more participants correctl%, tý - 
operating the exit than those in the photographic briefing card group. The benefits of 
additional wording on the safety briefing cards were not realised as there was no 
significant difference in exit operation accuracy between the card with v"ording and its 
equivalent without words. 
7.3.2.3 Position of operation 
The briefing cards showing an operator, all depicted him or her operating the exit 
from a standing position. The majority of passengers mimicked this action and chose 
to operate the exit whilst standing. The simplified pictorial diagrams which did depict 
an operator and as a consequence did not show the position from which to operate the 
exit or which hand to pull the handle also resulted in the majority of particpants 
operating the exit from a standing position. These participants commented that the 
diagrams were very clear because they only had to concentrate on what the exit was 
doing and not on how to mimic the operator in the diagram. Interestingly, those 
individuals who were shown the video instructions were more likely to operate the 
exit from a seated position (as shown in the video). 
The results clearly indicate that participants natural response was to operate the exit 
from a standing position, however, having watched on video another passenger 
operating the exit from a seated position, more participants in this group copied this 
behaviour. The trained operator used during Muir and Marrisons' study (1989), has 
reported that he found it easier to operate the exit from a seated position. Before 
advocating briefing material depict such a method of operation, further work is 
required to quantify the impact of operating position on naive participants speed and 
accuracy of operation. It is suggested that such experimental work should be carried 
out in both an individual and group evacuation scenario. 
7.3.3 Questionnaire information 
7.3.3.1 Difficulty of operation and clarity of instructions 
Participants were asked to rate the difficulty of opening and disposing of the exit, the 
results indicated that there were no significant differences between the mode of 
presentation groups. Participants rated disposing of the exit as much harder than 
opening it. This result supports the suggestion in section 7.3.2.1, that the task itself is 
very difficult to carry out and any form of briefing instruction (apart from hands on 
practice) will probably fail to prepare passengers for the weight of the hatch and 
subsequent manoeuvrability difficulties. 
When participants were asked to rate the clarity of the opening and disposing 
instructions there were again no significant differences between the groups. As with 
the difficulty ratings for the performance of the actions participants consistently rated 
the disposal instructions as less clear then the opening instructions. The opening 
instructions on the briefing cards are shown in two pictures. The first shows which 
handles to use and the second indicates that the hatch comes free from the fuselage. 
The disposal instructions however are all contained in the final diagram which 
indicates firstly that the exit must be turned on its side and secondly that it has to be 
placed out on the wing. Having the two procedures contained in one diagram 
somewhat simplifies the actions that need to be taken and may actually be confusing 
for an individual who has never operated such a exit before. It is suggested that it 
would be useful to evaluate alternative instructions which separate these two tasks. 
Whilst the ratings were not significantly different, the video operating instructions 
were rated as the clearest. This is not surprising as this group had actually observed 
another passenger disposing of the exit onto the wing. The photographic card was 
rated has being the most unclear, again this supports the hypothesis that photographs 
are rich in detail and information, making it difficult for individuals to pick out the 
relevant points. Further work investigating participants eye scanning patterns and 
d,, ý-ell times when looking at briefing cards may highlight disparities between the time 
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they take to look and interpret photographs in comparison to drawings. The use of 
eye-tracking will also provide a method of assessing any details that passengers are 
failing to attend to on both briefing cards and videos. It would then be possible to 
evaluate the way in which variations in layout, design and colour can be used to 
ensure the necessary safety information is extracted by passengers. Such 
experimentation may also be used to assess ways in which variations in briefing 
material can increase passenger attention. 
7.3.3.2 Exit operating difficulties 
Participants reported finding a number of difficulties when operating the Type III exit. 
The most frequently mentioned were the weight of the exit, manoeuvrability of such a 
large and heavy object and not knowing where to dispose of the exit. When asked 
about how heavy the exit was a large proportion of the participants said that they had 
underestimated the weight of the exit and that it took them longer than they expected 
to make the exit available. Twenty three percent felt that a warning about the weight 
of the exit would have extremely beneficial. Further work to assess the impact of 
warning passengers about the weight of the exit is required. Such a study would 
evaluate whether passengers can really be better prepared for the weight of the exit as 
a result of being informed of its weight, whilst at the same time assessing whether this 
might have any negative impact on perfon-nance. 
7.3.3.3 Attitudes towards safety 
When asked to agree or disagree with the statement "if I was unfortunate to be 
involved in an aircraft accident my chances of survival would be minimal" just over 
half of the participants disagreed (section 7.2.6.1). Surprisingly twenty seven percent 
(13) of the participants felt that their chances would be minimal. When talking to the 
participants after the test many felt that most aircraft accidents were non-survivable, a 
view that had been cultivated from publicity of recent catastrophic accidents. Many 
suggested that the general public should be made more aware of how safe air travel 1. 
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actually is and be given more information on safety related topics. They went on 
further to state that if passengers realised that their chances in an accident were 
relatively positive that they would then be more likely to pay attention to safety 
information, realising that they have to take responsibility for their survi,,,, al. 
The ma ority of participants felt that pre-flight briefings provided essential 
information and that passengers should read safety cards carefullY. These findings 
were interesting because only thirty one percent of the participants said that they 
actually watch the pre-flight safety briefings and read the safety cards when the-,,, fly. 
Most participants commented that having taken part in the test that they nov. " realised 
the importance of the safety information and that they would pay attention to the 
information in the future. Again this result supports the need for some form of 
passenger education. 
7.3.3.4 Preferred briefing card 
All of the participants were shown nine alternative briefing cards and asked, from 
their experience, to chose the one that best depicted the operation of the Type III exit. 
Twenty two participants (40%) preferred the photographic card used during the testing 
programme. It would seem that participants preferred this card because the pictures 
were depicting "real life" and they thought that these were visually more appealing 
and clearer than many of the hand drawn instructions. However the study showed that 
participants who were shown this card found it difficult to understand where to 
dispose of the exit. So, whilst participants preferred photographs as a medium the 
actual photographs used during the testing appeared to lack the clarity necessary to 
show participants how to perform the task. This result clearly supports the need for 
thorough evaluation of safety material that is to be used by passengers. The material C) 
will normally be designed by an individual who is familiar with how to use the 
equipment and as a consequence they may fail to predict any difficulties untrained 
naive passengers may have in interpreting safety information. As previously 
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mentioned the use of eye-tracking data would be beneficial in investigating participant 
difficulties in interpretation of briefing cards. 
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7.4 CONCL USIONS 
I. Participants were confused about whether they should don their life jacket 
whilst standing as the cabin crew had demonstrated, this confusion could be 
over come by using a video or computer generated demonstration -with the 
person donning the life jacket whilst seated. 
2. The time taken by participants to make the exit available (operate and dispose 
of exit) was quicker when the exit information had been presented in the form 
of a video. Although this result was not significant. 
3. Providing participants with information relating to the operation of the Type 
III exit improved their performance accuracy. 
4. The correct disposal of the exit was significantly influenced by the mode of 
presentation of the information. Significantly more participants correctly 
disposed of the exit when they had been shown the video. 
5. Photographic diagrams for the Type III exit operation were very confusing to 
passengers. Perforniance accuracy was significantly worse in this group of 
participants in comparison to the other briefing cards. 
6. The introduction of wording on the briefing card did not appear to improve 
participant exit operation performance. 
7. Additional safety briefings informing passengers that they are sat next to exits 
are useful in capturing passengers attention, informing them of their 
responsibility to operate the exit and may influence the amount of attention 
passengers give to safety information. 
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8. Individuals who watched the video presentation rated the difficulty of opening 
and disposing of the exit as easier than individuals in the other groups. I 
9. Participants found the size and weight of the exit hatch difficult to manage, 
particularly as many had under estimated the exit's vveight. Further work is 
necessary to assess the influence of infonning passengers of the exit hatch 
weight prior to its operation. 
10. Participants attitudes towards safety indicate that a large proportion 
underestimate their chances of survival. There is a great need for a passenger 
education campaign to inform passengers of how safe air travel is, as well as 
the importance of safety information. 
11. Airlines must think carefully about the method in which they present safety 
related information. There is a great need to evaluate both pre-flight briefings 
and more importantly briefing cards on members of the public, prior to them 
entering service, to ensure that untrained passengers can really understand all 
of the information that is being presented. 
12. Further experimental work is required to assess the impact of other passengers 
trying to escape on naive passengers operation speed and accuracy of the Type 
III exit. Such research would also allow the evaluation of the best position 
from which to operate the exit. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS OF THE RESEARCH PROGRAMME AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
8.1 Conclusions 
The experimental testing programme clearly confirmed and illustrated many of the 
difficulties that members of the public can have in operating Type III exits. The two 
different approaches taken to improving passenger performance, exit improvement 
and instruction, illustrated that both Type III exit operation speed and accuracy could 
be improved. 
The preferred solution to passenger operation difficulties was shown to be the 
redesign of the Type III exit mechanism, constraining its motion so that it did not 
become a loose item once opened. This removed the requirement for participants to 
support and manoeuvre a heavy weight, significantly increasing the speed and 
accuracy at which they were able to operate the exit. Anecdotal evidence collected 
during the debrief of participants suggested that even if they had not really paid 
attention to the operating instructions, on release of the operating handle the exit 
began to move up in to the overhead locker, providing a cue as to what they were 
meant to do. The study has clearly indicated the benefits of simplification of 
equipment for use by passengers, this is of particular importance when taking into 
account the variety of behaviours passengers may exhibit during an emergency. 
In the future any new designs of equipment should attempt to be as simple and 
intuitive to use as possible and it is suggested that the manufacturers as a matter of 
course should test new equipment with naive participants. 
The provision of practice was shown to improve performance in participants operating 
both the traditional and modified Type III exits. Even after three attempts however. 
the speed at which participants could operate the traditional exit was not as quick as 
participants operating the modified exit for the first time. Furthen-nore nearly a third 
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of participants operating the traditional exit after three attempts were still leaving the 
exit inside the aircraft. 
This result strongly supports the suggestion of the introduction of safety centres in 
airport lounges. As a minimum, training for those individuals being seated next to the 
overwing exit should be available. It would not be entirely impossible to stamp 
individuals passports or log on their frequent flyer details that they have been Type III 
exit trained, indicating to check in staff that they could be seated next to the exit. The 
provision of such training would not only help to improve the speed and accuracy of 
passenger operation but ensure that passengers know when they should operate the 
exits, ensuring all available means of escape are used during an emergencý' 
evacuation. 
The results of the study indicated that providing instruction either in the form of 
verbal instruction or visual (cards or video) could increase the speed, and more 
importantly significantly improve participants accuracy of operation. The most 
successful form of instruction was through the use of videos, which clearly showed 
the exact steps necessary to operate and dispose of the exit. Observing a 'fellow 
passenger' provided participants with an opportunity to mentally rehearse the 
procedure they had to use. 
Briefing cards were also shown to aid the accuracy with which participants operated 
the exit. The use of photographs however, was shown to be a poor medium with 
which to present procedural task information, it appeared to provide a wealth of 
information from which participants found it difficult to extract all the relevant 
operation information. It is imperative that airlines think carefully about the method 
in which they present safety related information. They should be encouraged to trial 
new designs of cards or instructions for new equipment on individuals who are not 
familiar xNith the aviation industry thus ensuring that even the most infrequent flyers 
caii easily interpret and understand the safety infori-nation. 
119 
8.2 Recommendationsfor thefuture 
Manufacturers need to make every effort to simplify the method of operation of 
equipment to be used by passengers in an emergency. Equipment needs to be easy 
and intuitive to use, thus increasing the chances of correct operation in a hiohly 
stressful situation such as an aircraft accident. 
The provision of practice which could be utilised in the introduction of safety centres 
was shown to be a useful way of improving passengers' ability to operate safety 
equipment. A study assessing airlines, airports and passenger attitudes to such a 
scheme should be carried out. 
The results of the mode of instruction study clearly indicated that the way in which 
information is presented can increase or decrease passenger comprehension of safety 
information, as well as their willingness to pay attention. Further research is required 
to investigate exactly what information passengers are (or are not) attending to in 
safety information. The use of an eye-tracking system may prove beneficial in a 
further evaluation of exit operation diagrams/instructions. 
None of the studies carried out evaluating mode of presentation to date has evaluated 
the impact of time delay on passenger ability to perform safety tasks. Further research 
investigating the retention of safety information over the duration of European and 
transatlantic flights would be beneficial and may provide support for the re briefing of 
passengers prior to landing (as is being carried out by some North American airlines. ) 
Evidence from the second study also indicated that passengers are still unaware of 
how high their survival chances are in an emergency, many indicated that this was one 
of the reasons for their lack of attention to safety information. It is suggested that the 
introduction of some form of passenger education could be useful to encourage 
passengers to not only pay attention to safety information but conform to baggage 
requirement, smoking restrictions etc. 
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The comments of many participants in the study indicated that many were surprised 
by the sheer weight of the exit and would have benefited from being informed of the 
exits exact weight, further research is required to investigate the benefits of informing 
passengers of the weight of the exit prior to its operation. 
Careful consideration must now be given as to how to select passengers who should 
be seated next to the exit. Further emphasis must be placed on advising passengers of 
their responsibilities when seated next to the exit and as a minimum draw their 
attention to the current form of safety infon-nation. 
All of the Type III exit operation studies to date have been carried out on an 
individual basis, the next step forward must be the assessment of the impact of other 
passengers on participants ability to operate the emergency exit. It is hypothesised 
that the introduction of other "passengers" will also serve to raise the level of stress 
and anxiety the operator may feel during the tests, further increasing the realism. The 
use of such an experimental methodology would also investigate further the benefits 
which could be accrued by the introduction of the modified Type III exit mechanism. 
Currently all of the data from the exit operation trials has been made available to 
computer modelers who are developing evacuation models to be used by the 
manufacturers and aviation authorities. Data from Type III exit operation tests 
involving other passengers would further add to the information about time delays in 
exit availability and the impact that this may have on the subsequent evacuation times. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A Type III exit hatch weights 
Type III exit hatch weights 
Hatch weight 
Aircraft Type kgs lbs 
A320 14.5 
Fokker 100 15.5 33 4.2 
F28 MK 1000/2000/3000/4000 16 
BAe 146-300 16 5. 
ATP 21 46.33 
Mercure 18.9 41.7 
Caravelle 10 25 5 5.2 
Boeing 737 - 100/200/300/400/500 21 46. ) 
Boeing 737 - 400 lightweight 17 336 
Boeing 767 3 0.3 _ 67 
MD 83 17.6 33 8.8 
DC 8 25.5 56.33 
Appendix B Modified Exit Details 
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Appendix C Seating Arrangement Diagrams 
Plan diagram of simulator - outboard seat removed tests 
Plan diagram of simulator - 13" vertical projection tests 
Outboard seat removed seating configuration diagrams 
iv 1 
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v 13 vertical projection seating configuration diagrams witý dummy present 
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Appendix D Briefing cards - experiment one 
Traditional exit briefing card 
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Modified exit briefing card 
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Appendix E Experiment one questionnaire 
Appendix E Experiment one questionnaire 
Cranfield University 
Department of Applied Psychology 
Questionnaire Number I 
Volunteer Number 
Please complete the relevant sections of the questionnaire and return it to the 
researcher 
ZTick 
as applicable 
1. Did you pay close attention to the safety briefing given by the cabin crew member" I 
Yes Fý 
No 11 4 go to Q. 2 
If yes, did this aid your escape? 
Yes 
No 
If yes, how did it aid your escape? 
If no, why didn't it aid your escape? 
2. Did you pay close attention to the additional safety briefing given by the cabin crew 
member, indicating that you were seated next to the overwing exit and might therefore 
be required to operate it in an emergency situation? 
Yes 0 
No 11 4 go to Q. 3 
If yes, did this aid your escape? 
Yes 0 
No Fl 
If yes, how did it aid your escape? 
If no, why didn't it aid your escape? 
3. Did you study the safety card in detail? 
Yes Fl 
No Cl 4 go to Q. 4 
If yes, did this aid your escape? 
Yes 0 
No El 
If yes, how did it aid your escape? 
If no, why didn't it aid your escape? 
4. Did you study the diagrams on the safety card/placard showing the method of 
operating the overwing exit in detail? 
Yes 0 
No 11 4 go to Q. 5 
If yes, did this aid your escape? 
Yes 
No 
If yes, how did it aid your escape? 
If no, why didn't it aid your escape? 
5. If you have any suggestions of ways in which the safety briefing or card/placard 
could be improved, such that they increase your likelihood of escape in an emergency 
situation please write them in the space below: 
6. Were you hinder you in your access to the exit from your seat? 
Yes 0 
No 13 --> go to Q. 7 
If yes, what were you hindered by? 
7. In opening the exit, please rate how easy or difficult you found the following by 
circling the appropriate number on the scale below: 
Very Easy 
The location of the exit in 
relation to your seat 
Finding the exit's operating 
handle 
The clarity of exit operating 
instructions 
Very Difficult 
I 
I 
I 
Using the exit's operating handle 1234567 
Opening the exit 1234567 
The weight of the exit I ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 ------ 6 ------- 7 
The size of the exit I ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 ------- 6 ------- 7 
Clarity of instructions for disposing I ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 ------- 6 ------- 7 
of the door 
Exiting through the exit onto 2356 
the wing 
8. Please describe in detail anything about the overwing exit that caused you 
difficulty. 
9. Did you operate the overwing exit from a seated or standing position? 
Seated 
Standing 
For what reason did you operate the exit from this position? 
10. How many times have you flown as an airline passenger before? (counting a 
return flight j ourney as one flight) 
Never 0 
1-5 El 
6-10 El 
11-15 11 
16-20 11 
21-25 El 
26-30 0 
31+ 0 
11. Have you ever experienced an aircraft emergency situation? 
Yes r-1 
No 04 go to Q. 7 
If yes, what kind of emergency situation was it and what happened? 
12. How often do you carry out strenuous physical exercise? 
Once a day 
3+ times a week 
1-2 times a week 
1-2 times a month 0 
less than 1-2 times a month 0 
13. If there are any ftirther points you would like to make please use the space 
provided below: 
THANK-YOU 
Cranfield University 
Department of Applied Psychology 
Volunteer Number 
Questionnaire Number 2 
Please complete the relevant sections of the questionnaire and return it to the 
researcher 
RITick 
as applicable 
1. Were you hinder you in your access to the exit from your seat? 
Yes 11 
No 04 go to Q. 7 
If yes, what were you hindered by? 
2. In opening the exit, please rate how easy or difficult you found the following by 
circling the appropriate number on the scale below: 
The location of the exit in 
relation to your seat 
Finding the exit's operating 
handle 
I 
The clarity of exit operating 2 ---------- )4567 
instructions 
Using the exit's operating handle 1 ------- 2 -------- 3 ------- 
4 ------- 5 ------- 67 
Opening the exit 
The weight of the exit 
The size of the exit 
I 
I 
I 
Clarity of instructions for disposing 1234567 
of the door 
Exiting through the exit onto I ------- 2 ---------- ) ------- 4 ------- 5 ------- 6 ------- 7 
the wing 
Very Easy Very Difficult 
I ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 ------- 6 ------- 7 
3. Please describe in detail anything about the overwing exit that caused you 
difficulty. 
4. Did you operate the overwing exit from a seated or standing position" 
Seated 
Standing 
For what reason did you operate the exit from this position? 
5. Did your experience at opening the overwing exit during the first safety trial lead 
you to do anything differently during the second trial? 
Yes 0 
No 04 go to Q. 6 
If yes, what did you do differently during the second trial?. 
6. Did your experience at opening the overwing exit during the first safety trial aid 
your escape from the aircraft during the second trial? 
Yes n 
No El 4 go to Q. 7 
If yes, how did it aid your escape? 
If no, why didn't it aid your escape? 
7. If there are any further points you would like to make please use the space provided 
below: 
Cranfield University 
Department of Applied Psychology 
Questionnaire Number 3 
Volunteer Number 
Please complete the relevant sections of the questionnaire and return it to the 
researcher 
ZTick 
as applicable 
1. Were you hinder you in your access to the exit from your seat? 
Yes 0 
No 11 4 go to Q. 7 
If yes, what were you hindered by? 
2. In opening the exit, please rate how easy or difficult you found the following by 
circling the appropriate number on the scale below: 
Very Easy 
The location of the exit in 
relation to your seat 
Finding the exit's operating 
handle 
The clarity of exit operating 
instructions 
Using the exit's operating handle 
Opening the exit 
The weight of the exit 
Very Difficult 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
The size of the exit 1234567 
Clarity of instructions for disposing I ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 ------- 6 ------- 7 
of the door 
Exiting through the exit onto 257 
the wing 
I Please describe in detail anything about the overwing exit that caused you 
difficulty. 
4. Did you operate the overwing exit from a seated or standing position? 
Seated 
Standing 
For what reason did you operate the exit from this position? 
5. Did your experience at opening the overwing exit during the second safety trial lead 
you to do anything differently during the third trial? 
Yes 11 
No 04 go to Q. 6 
If yes, what did you do differently during the third trial? 
6. Did your experience at opening the overwing exit during the second safety trial aid 
your escape from the aircraft during the third trial? 
Yes rl 
No 04 go to Q. 7 
If yes, how did it aid your escape? 
If no, why didn't it aid your escape? 
7. If there are any further points you would like to make please use the space provided 
below: 
THANK-YOU 
Appendix F Experiment one Pre-flight briefing transcript 
Passenger Safety Briefing For Type III 
On passenger boarding 
Ladies and gentlemen, Welcome on board. For your personal safety, any light articles which you ha\e 
brought aboard the aircraft should be placed in the overhead bins or under the seat in front of you. Please 
ensure that hand luggage does not obstruct the aisles or any emergency exit. Passengers are asked to 
refrain from smoking until the no smoking signs have been switched off. Portable telephones must not be 
used at any time. Electronic items such as computers, tape recorders etc. may only be used when the seat 
belt signs are off. 
Directly to participant sat by the Type III exit 
I would like to draw your attention to the fact that you are sat by an emergency exit, should there be an 
emergency you would be expected to operate this exit. Instructions showing the method of operation can 
be found on the safety briefing card in the seat pocket in front of you and on the safety placard on the back 
of the seat, here. 
After the doors are closed 
Ladies and Gentlemen, as the safety equipment on this aircraft may differ from that on other aircraft it is in 
your own best interest to pay attention to this safety briefing. In the seat pocket in ftont of you there is a 
safety card which the Captain would like you to read carefully before take-off. This contains details of the 
demonstration. 
The emergency exits are clearly marked and are being pointed out to you. These are the two doors at the 
rear of the cabin and an additional exit in the centre of the cabin. 
For those of you unfamiliar with the operation of the seat belt it is fastened and adjusted as demonstrated 
and unfastened like this. 
We would also like to advise you of the emergency oxygen supply on board. Should additional oxygen be 
required throughout the cabin, the panel above your head will open automatically and masks like these will 
drop down. Remain seated, pull the mask towards you, and place over nose and mouth and breathe 
normally. Adults should fit their own masks before assisting children. 
Please now ensure that your seat table is folded away, your seat back is upright with the armrests down, 
and your seat belt is tightly fastened. 
Thank you for your attention. We would like to wish you a pleasant flight. 
Appendix G Experiment One Accident scenarios 
Evacuation Scenarios 
Scenario 1 
After pre flight briefing " Ladies and gentlemen this is your captain speaking. We are currently in a queue Z:, 
of aircraft awaiting take off and should be airborne in a few minutes. " 
Engine noise for approximately 20 seconds then the command "Undo your seat belt and get out". 
Scenario 2 
Following the pre flight briefing a cabin check is made. 
A short engine noise lasting approximately 15 seconds is heard then the command " Undo your seat belt 
and get out " 
Scenario 3 
Following the pre flight briefing a cabin check is made. 
A long engine noise lasting approximately 30 seconds is heard culminating with a large bang is heard then t) tý t) 
the command " Undo your seat belt and get out 
Appendix H Experiment one raw evacuation times 
Evacuation times for the modified Type III exit 
* indicates incorrect disposal of the exit hatch. 
Subject 
Number 
Configuration Sex Age Handedness Height Weight Total 
evacuation 
time 
Evacuation 
time from 
handle 
1 13" Vertical F 21 Ri-ht 161 58 6.33 6 
Projection 10.02 6.86 
No Dummy 9.12 5.88 
2 13" Vertical M 35 Right 171 733 4.64 2.80 
Projection 4.60 2.92* 
No Dummy 4.64 3.08 
3 13" Vertical M 24 Left 172 70 7.92 4.5 8 
Projection 5.64 3.36 
No Dummy 5.02 3.20 
4 13" Vertical F 23 Right 162 59 7.28 5.24 
Projection 7.56 4.88 
Dummy present 7.00 5.14 
5 13" Vertical M 39 Right 170 65 15.16 8.16 
Projection 13.48 6.72 
Dummy present 11.44 5.52 
6 13" Vertical F 21 Right 161 62 16.60 10.72 
Projection 10.44 7.12 
Dummy present 10.16 6.88 
7 13" Vertical F 44 Right 157 62 11.00 8.80 
Projection 7.44 4.40 
Dummy present 6.04 3.88 
8 13" Vertical F 28 Left 162 60 26.00 15.32 
Projection 9.80 5.20 
Dummy present 7.80 5.00 
9 13" Vertical M 1 Right 172 81 5.92 3.20 
Projection 5.32 2.00 
Dummy present 5.32 2.72 
10 13" Vertical F 40 Left 161 52 8.24 4.24 
Projection 7.00 3.88 
Dummy present 6.56 3.60 
11 13" Vertical M 34 Right 177 75 19.44 11.84 
Projection 16.72 10.60 
Dummy present 16.32 11.4 
12 13" Vertical F 20 Left 161 54 10.36 5.92 
Projection 8.20 4.60 
Dummy present 9.36 5.56 
13 13" Vertical F 21 Left 160 58 9.34 6.60* 
Projection 9.52 6.40 
Dummy present 8.76 5.52 
14 13" Vertical M 33 4 Left 175 70 13.32 92 
Projection 7.12 4.40 
Dummy present 5.92 4.12 
15 Outboard seat F Left 164 63) 6.08 2.68 
removed 5.92 2.44 
1 5.44 2.12 
16 Outboard seat M 25 Left 170 65 11.40 6.48* 
removed 1 11.84 4.48* 
8.60 4.76* 
17 1 133" Vertical F 2 33 Right 157 58 9.92 4.96 
Projection 7.20 3.60 
Dummy present 6.44 2.88 
18 13" Vertical F 34 Left 165 64 6.7 3.24 
Projection 4.16 2.36 
NoDummy 4.52 2.50 
19 13" Vertical M 20 Left 171 62 5.44 2.96 
Projection 5.84 3.60 
No Dummy 3.88 2.56 
20 13" Vertical F 35 Left 161 64 5.98 2.96 
Projection 5.96 3.60 
NoDummy 5.84 3.14 
21 13" Vertical M 36 Right 173 69 7.74 4.60 
Projection 7.40 4.76 
Dummy present 6.60 4.56 
22 13" Vertical M 40 Left 171 63 12.32 9.32 
Projection 7.14 4.28 
Dummy present 7.24 4.52 
23 13" Vertical F 43 Left 161 63 10.60 8.08 
Projection 10.84 5.88 
No Dummy 8.56 4.75 
24 13" Vertical M 42 Left 172 70 11.04 5.24 
Projection 9.24 5.10 
Dummy present 9.82 4.84 
25 13" Vertical F 41 Right 160 47 6.56 3.52 
Projection 6.86 3.56 
No Dummy 5.76 2.80 
26 13" Vertical F 48 Left 157 48 10.40 4.48 
Projection 7.40 5.32 
No Dummy 6.88 4.96 
27 13" Vertical M 48 Right 176 70 7.20 2.80* 
Projection 7.16 3.52* 
No Dummy 5.28 2.96* 
28 13" Vertical M 48 Left 165 66 6.00 4-28 
Projection 5.60 33.12 
No Dummy 6.04 33 
. 76 
29 13" Vertical M 38 Left 170 6j -7 9.12 4.1 
Projection 7.14 3.82 
NoDummy 6.88 
30 13" Vertical F 42 Right 160 57 9.96 4.08 
Projection 5.66 2.92 
No Dummy 4.80 2.68 
31 Outboard seat M 42 Left 171 70 5.60 3.84 
removed 6.36 3.64 
5.70 3.32 
32 13" Vertical F 43 Ri2ht 160 59 7.64 33.0 8 
Projection 4.68 2.60 
NoDummy 5.05 2.57 
333 Outboard seat M 46 Right 172 66 4.68 2.52 
removed 5.04 2.88 
5.24 
. 
33.33 2 
34 Outboard seat F 43 Right 162 57 6.24 3.96 
removed 6.56 33.2 0 
5.12 3.28 
35 13" Vertical M 37 Right 172 70 8.40 5.64 
Projection 7.28 5.36 
No Dummy 6.24 4.28 
36 Outboard seat M 28 Left 171 71 8.44 3.71 
removed 8.52 2.84* 
8.20 3.36 
37 Outboard seat F 22 Right 163 64 8.92 5.40 
removed 7.00 4.44* 
7.28 3.88 
38 Outboard seat F 28 Right 162 64 10.12 4.52 
removed 6.48 3.80 
5.16 2.92 
39 Outboard seat M 35 Ri-ht In 
172 67 9.56 4.40 
removed 6.16 3.72* 
6.20 2.88 
40 Outboard seat F 35 Left 161 64 6.16 3.08 
removed 7.98 3.70 
6.04 
41 Outboard seat F 47 Left 161 60 9.52 3.76 
removed 6.52 4.20 
1 5.76 3.08 
42 Outboard seat M 38 Right 174 74 6.44 3.96 
removed 7.00 4.56 
6.44 1 4.28 
43 Outboard seat M 30 Right 175 70 4.84 1.5 -1 
removed 4.44 1.96 
4.08 2.08 
44 Outboard seat F 34 Left 158 66 8.36 4.80 
removed 7.76 3.84 
6.26 3.3 6 
45 Outboard seat F 23 Right 162 64 8.80 -5.16 
removed 6.48 3. f6 
5.68 3.72 
46 13" Vertical M 34 Left 175 70 6.64 4.64 
Projection 6.12 4.28 
Dummy present 6.04 33.68 
47 Outboard seat M 25 Left 175 70 9.28 33.6 0 
removed 7.28 33.40 
6.80 3.44 
48 13" Vertical M 23 Right 173 70 10.16 4.00 
Projection 8.36 4.40 
No Dummy 6.28 
Evacuation times for the Traditional Type III exit 
* Indicates incorrect disposal of exit hatch 
Subject 
Number 
Configuration Sex A-e Handedness Hei ht 9 Weiaht Total 
Evacuatio 
n time 
Evacuation 
time from 
handle 
1 13" Vertical M 21 Right 177 80 14.80 8.88 
Projection 12.3-2 8-70 
No Dummy 11.44 6.84 
2 13" Vertical F 28 Right 161 59 12.04 9.24 * 
Projection 19.84 17.08* 
No Dummy 12.64 10.56* 
3 13" Vertical M 24 Left 171 68 12.28 8.5 -1 * Projection 10.20 6.92 * 
No Dummy 10.24 6.92* 
4 13" Vertical M 37 Left 169 65 9.214 6.44* 
Projection 8.76 5.64 * 
No Dummy 9.80 6.60 
5 13" Vertical F 29 Right 162 68 23.76 17.72 
Projection 19.40 14.52 
No Dummy 18.36 14.60 
6 13" Vertical M 3) 7 Right 175 70 14.24 9.00* 
Projection 14.56 9.44 
No Dummy 11.68 7.84 
7 13" Vertical F 26 Right 175 64 16.82 10.84* 
Projection 17.88 13.16 
No Dummy 16.64 11.68 
8 13" Vertical F 30 Right 156 55 28.56 21.32 
Projection 18.68 12.12 
NoDummy 23.40 15.00 
9 13" Vertical M 32 Left 171 66 12.84 10.72 
Projection 13.04 10.12 
No Dummy 12.80 9.72 
10 13" Vertical M 28 Left 180 70 14.32 9.96 
Projection 10.80 7.00 
No Dummy 9.20 6.20 
11 13" Vertical F 21 Right 165 67 30.92 24.16* 
Projection 18.12 12.92 * 
Dummy present 13.40 8.60* 
12 13" Vertical M 22 Right 171 67 29.00 19.28 
Projection 25.00 12.04 
Dummy present 16.56 7.60 
13 13" Vertical F 24 Left 165 57 30.64 26.34 
Projection 28.60 23.56 
Dummy present 19.04 14.76* 
14 13" Vertical M 35 Left 176 83 16.80 14.00- 
Projection 19.48 15.68 
Dummy present 12.92 10.20 
15 13" Vertical M 23) Left 170 65 28.04 7, 
. 
96 ' 
Projection 17.28 12.28* 
Dummy present 13.00 8.72 
16 13" Vertical F 40 Left 15 5 55 17.3-1 13.64* 
Projection 10.12 6.92* 
Dummy present 16.34 13.96* 
17 13" Vertical F 45 Left 167 61 29.76 25.28* 
Projection 33 0.4 0 23.08 
Dummy present 32.44 26.96 
18 13" Vertical M 49 Right t: ) 175 75 11.20 8.52* 
Projection 10.48 8.06* 
Dummy present 8.214 6.04 * 
19 13" Vertical M 22 Right 176 64 8.88 6.40 
Projection 9.10 6.36 
Dummy present 8.60 6.16 
20 13" Vertical M 23 Left 171 72 33 2.8 4 28.48* 
Projection 23.88 19.52* 
Dummy present 14.72 11.96* 
21 13" Vertical M 24 Right 176 79 12.28 7.92 
Projection 10.76 7.04 
No Dummy 9.60 6.60 
22 13" Vertical F 43 Right 168 66 13.84 11.96 
Projection 20.84 18.52 
Dummy present 18.72 16.72 
23 13" Vertical F 46 Right 167 62 14.08 12.24* 
Projection 9.12 7.40 
Dummy present 10.24 8.48 
24 13" Vertical M 23 Right 175 67 11.72 8.76* 
Projection 14.20 11.64 
NoDummy 12.84 10.3 
25 Outboard seat M 33 Right 181 68 15.52 8.04* 
removed 31.72 20.40 
13.56 9.08 
26 Outboard seat F 48 Left 158 63 22.00 18.92 
removed 19.44 14.52 
16.16 11.36 
27 Outboard seat M 38 Left 173 76 11.76 6.84* 
removed 10.20 6.12 * 
10.42 6.92 
28 Outboard seat M 3) 5 Right 164 70 23.48 16.16* 
removed 3 1.4 0 21.92* 
18.72 10.60* 
29 Outboard seat M 48 Left 175 7-7, 12.80 6.12* 
removed 11.44 5.4 8* 
14.48 9.72 
30 Outboard seat M 33 Left 172 80 16.12 11.48, 
removed 11-96 6.76* 
14-08 9.76 
31 Outboard seat F 40 Right 164 59 7.40 ý. -)4* 
removed 1 -3) - 3) 6 7.76* 
7.28 5.24* 
32 Outboard seat M 37 Right 165 75 17.08 11.28 
removed 11.20 8.36 
11.48 9.00 
33 Outboard seat M 41 Right 174 62 12.52 7.68* 
removed 9.72 7.08 
10.28 7.68 
34 Outboard seat F 31 Right 161 56 18.82 1 1.3). 76 
removed 13-20 6.96* 
13.62 7.06* 
35 Outboard seat M 2 3) Left 176 63 15-08 8.04 
removed 13-80 9.32 
10.80 8.16 
36 13" Vertical F 36 Right 157 60 12.20 7.84* 
Projection 12.12 8.64* 
Dummy present 22.12 18.44 
37 13" Vertical M 32 Right 175 80 7.44 5.92 
Projection 9.62 7.48 
Dummy present 6.88 5.32 
38 13" Vertical M 26 Left 178 80 18.88 15.48 
Projection 15.40 11.48 
Dummy present 13.00 9.40 
39 13" Vertical F 23 Left 159 65 25.60 22.88 
Projection 18.40 15.52 
Dummy present 15.68 13.40 
40 1.3" Vertical F 24 Left 165 70 9.60 7.04* 
Projection 10.00 8.04 
No Dummy 9.72 7.80 
41 13" Vertical F 43 Left 157 61 19.68 15.96 
Projection 17.52 13. -3) 6 
No Dummy 20.68 17.60 
42 13" Vertical F 20 Left 160 47 15.52 10.64* 
Projection 15.24 10.80* 
No Dummy 14.48 8.84* 
43 13" Vertical F 23 Left 157 57 18.52 12.40* 
Projection 20.12 13.04* 
No Dummy 21.08 11.52 
44 Outboard seat 26 Left 165 49 1-1.40 6-88* 
removed 12.56 7.36* 
13.12 7.9 2 
45 Outboard seat F 33 Right 165 62 15.96 9.3 6 
removed 22.32 17.80* 
2 1.5 2 17 . 
84 
46 Outboard seat F 22 Right 155 55 11.80 8.96 
removed 14.88 1 I. -IS 
14.84 11-88 
47 Outboard seat F 28 Left 164 44 16.68 12-28* 
removed 11.24 7.88* 
10.44 8.3-* 
48 Outboard seat F 21 Left 156 57 19.64 10.66 
removed 15.20 15.5 2 
14.68 10.0 
Appendix I Experiment two Pre-flight safety briefing 
On passenger boarding 
Ladies and Gentlemen. Welcome on board. For your personal safetv. any light articles 
which you brought aboard the aircraft should be placed In the overhead bi ins or under the 
seat in front of you. Please ensure that hand luggage does not obstruct the aisles or any 
emergency exit. Passengers are asked to refrain from smoking until the no smoking signs have been switched off. Portable telephones must not be used at any time. Electronic 
items such as computers, tape recorders etc. may only be used %vhen the seat belt signs are Z-- off. 
After the doors are closed 
Ladies and gentlemen. As the safety equipment on this aircraft may differ from that on 
other aircraft it is in your own best interest to pay attention to this safety briefing. In the 
seat pocket in front of you there is a safety card which the captain would like you to read 
carefully before take-off. This contains details of the demonstration. Please note the 
brace position, which you will be asked to adopt in the event of an emergency landing. 
The emergency exits are clearly marked and are being pointed out to you. These are the 
two doors at the rear of the cabin. There is also an additional overwing emergency exit 
located in the centre of the cabin. Floor level lighting will illuminate showing the routes 
to these exits. 
For those of you unfamiliar with the operation of the seat belt it is fastened and adjusted 
as demonstrated and unfastened like this. 
We would also like to advise you of the emergency oxygen supply on board. Should 
additional oxygen be required throughout the cabin, the panel above your head will open 
automatically -and masks like these will drop down. Remain seated, pull the mask 
towards you, place over nose and mouth and breathe normally. Adults should fit their 
own masks before assisting children. 
A lifejacket is stowed in a pocket beneath your seat. Remove it from the container. Pass 
the jacket over your head and pull the tapes down, cross them at the back, bring to the 
side and tie the tapes securely in a double bow. To inflate the jacket pull the red toggle 
sharply downwards. It can also be inflated or topped up by blowing into this tube. The 
jacket has a light and a whistle for attracting attention. Please note: your life jacket must 
only be inflated outside the aircraft otherwise this would obstruct your exit. 
Please now ensure your seat table is folded away, your seat back is upright with the 
armrests down , and your seat belt is tightly fastened. 
Thank you for your attention. We would like to wish you a pleasant flight. 
Additional exit briefing 
Before we take off I would like to advise you that you are sat next to an emergency exit. 
Should there be a need to evacuate this aircraft, you may have to operate the exit. 
Appendix J Experiment Two Briefing cards 
i Pictorial briefing card 
ii Simplified pictorial briefing card 
iii Photographic briefing card 
iv Pictorial with words briefing card 
Pictorial Briefing Card 
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Simplified pictorial briefing card 
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iii Photographic briefing card 
13oeing737 ISSUE 
FOR YOU14 SAFM 
Poupt VOTF%9 adcu" 
Pon Mg VCHEROMEFT 
P" LA VOSTRA SOCUREZZA 
PARA SU SEOUP40AD 2 
pMtA A SUA SEQUOtANI; A 
A-), 
L 
r 
ýOXYGEN 
No offokmIg ROMWA hogh he* WW" IN 0kV9- 
Me pso kjMw r-moo, *$ . 0-mws A' houm tebm Anamsop mmo Sam cm secom Scnw MW hohsrn AbsaU auszwc*m 
Oxygww 
NICM rouchmn Nolho" W"-" 14OLWA904 sauvow 
Non konamp lbý Is "PO Ow- - Afts"*W Imtow *---We ism a s-Wg@M" 0-9- 
No kwm oukenn kft -p- do IW641 AloWrtz"s lorww Saba do ur9was 0.94m 
qw -"; > ;,,, ý-*o IV" _ýA# týj jo b, ý, j ve 
livo am" omw ý. . 0"aw"am. -so, " 
**, 
w 
'' fc- . *)Iku NL ( A-Z I 
LAM n"Cti 9 13vahTe rd, w%jloT6rj*uvck 
'A" 
TWA 14060( ý66-ov O(VY0.0 ýayw 
M 
my"m 
moccrvc.. o 10000"Gookon 
I 
JXYGEP 
a 
Boeing 737 ISSUE 
P01i YOUR SAFM 
POUR VOTRI StCURITt 
FOR IHRE SICHERNEIT 
PER LA VOSTRA SICUREZZA 
PARA SU SIEGURIGAD 
PARA A SUA SEGURANO; A 
I-tA: - a_, ý uO , -ý 
a 
iv Pictorial with words briefing card 
Boeing 737 ISSUE FOR Y04JR SAFETY 
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Life jacket under seat 
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Place over head Tie around waist 
under jacket 
Appendix K Verbal exit briefing 
Verbal instructions 
To operate the exit you must grip the operating handles firmly. I 
Pull down the red handle. 
Lift the exit in towards you. 
Turn the exit on its side and throw it out on to the wing. 
Appendix L Experiment two Video briefing 
Video Briefing 
The monitors screen dimesions were I P/2X 9 inches (29cm X 2-33cm). The screen was on 
top of the seat back in front of the exit approximately 39 inches (I 00cm) from the 
particpants eyes. 
The video showed a male passenger seated adjacent to the Type III exit. The passenger 
remained seated while operating the exit. The description below was heard 
simultaneously as the passenger performed the actions. 
"Instructions for the operation of the Type III exit. Hold the operating handles firmly, 
pull the upper handle down, lift the exit inwards towards you, turn it on its side and place 
it out onto the wing" 
Appendix M Experiment two Questionnaire 
Cranfield University 
Human Factors Group 
Questionnaire 
Volunteer Number 
Please complete the relevant sections of the questionnaire and return it to the researcher 
OTick as applicable 
Did you pay close attention to the pre flight safety briefing given by the cabin 
crew member? 
Yes 0 
No 11 go to Q. 2 
If yes, did this aid your escape? 
Yes 
No 
If yes, how did it aid your escape? 
If no, why didn't it aid your escape? 
If you did not receive an additional safety briefing please go to question 3 
2. Did you pay close attention to the additional safety briefing given by the cabin 
crew member, indicating that you were seated next to the overwing exit and 
might therefore be required to operate it in an emergency situation" 
Yes F] 
No El 4 go to Q. 3 
If yes, did this aid your escape? 
Yes 
No 
If yes, how did it aid your escape? 
If no, why didn't it aid your escape? 
3. Did you study the safety card in detail? 
Yes n 
No 11 4 go to Q. 4 
If yes, did this aid your escape? 
Yes El 
No 0 
If yes, how did it aid your escape? 
If no, why didn't it aid your escape? 
4. Did you study the diagrams on the safety card/placard showing the method of 
operating the overwing exit in detail? 
Yes 0 
No El go to Q. 5 
If yes, did this aid your escape? 
Yes 13 
No El 
If yes, how did it aid your escape? 
If no, why didn't it aid your escape? 
5. If you have any suggestions of ways in xhich the safety briefing or 
card/placard could be improved, such that they increase your likelihood of escape in an emergency situation please "Tite them in the space below: 
If you did not receive verbal operating instructions for the Type III exit please go to 
question 7. 
6. Did you listen carefully to the cabin crew's verbal description of how to open 
and dispose of the Type III exit? 
Yes 0 
No 11 4 go to Q. 7 
If yes, did this aid your operation of the Type III exit? 
Yes 
No 
If yes, how did it aid you in the operation of the Type III exit'? 
If no, why didn't it aid you in the operation of the Type III exit? 
If you did not watch a video showing the operation of the Type III exit please go to 
question 8. 
7. Did you watch the video demonstration of the operation of the Type III exit? 
Yes 0 
No El 4 go to Q. 8 
If yes, did this aid your operation of the Type III exit? 
Yes 
No 
If yes, how did it aid you in the operation of the Type III exit? 
If no, why didn't it aid you in the operation of the T-vpe III exit9 
8. Please indicate which form of safety information provided you witll the most 
help in operating the Type III exit? 
Pre flight safety briefing 
Additional Safety briefing 
Safety card 
Verbal operating instructions from the cabin crevv 
Video demonstration 
Why was this the most helpful? 
9 Is there any further information which would ha,,, -e been useful to you prior to 
operating the Type III exit? 
10. In opening the exit, please rate how easy or difficult you found the following 
by circling the appropriate number on the scale below: 
Very Easy 
The location of the exit in 
relation to your seat 
Finding the exit's operating 
handle 
The clarity of exit operating 
instructions (exit diagram) 
Using the exit's operating handle 
Opening the exit 
Disposing of the exit 
The weight of the exit 
The size of the exit 
Very Difficult 
1-2-3-4-5-6-7 
1-2-3-4-5-6-7 
1-2-3-4-5-6-7 
1-2-3-4-5-6-7 
1-2-3-4-5-6-7 
1-2-3-4-5-6-7 
12 
1) 
----------------- ) 
Clarity of instructions for disposing 12567 
of the door (exit diagram) 
Exiting through the exit onto 56 
the wing 
Please describe in detail anything about the ox. 'enving e,, it that caused ý-ou 
difficulty. 
12. Did you operate the overwing exit from a seated or standing position" 
Seated 0 
Standing 0 
For what reason did you operate the exit from this position' 
13. Did you find the exit to be: 
HEAVIER 
LIGHTER 
THE SAME AS EXPECTED 
14. Did you find that it took you: 
LONGER 
ABOUTTHESAME 
LESS TIME than you expected in opening the exit 
and evacuating 
15. Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements on the 7 point 
scale. 
Strongly 
disagree 
Strongly 
agree 
If I was unfortunate to be involved i 
an aircraft accident my chances of I ---------- )67 
survival would be minimal. 
Pre flight briefings provide essential 
safety information. I -------- 2 -------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 ------- 6 ------- 7 
Passengers do not need to watch the 
pre flight safety briefings every time I --------- ? --------- ------- 4 ------- 5 ------- 6 ------- 7 
they fly. 
Passengers should read the safety 
cards carefully. ---- ------- 4 ------- 5 ------- 6 ------- 7 
16. How many times have you flown as an airline passenger before? (counting a 
return flight j ourney as one flight) 
Never 0 
1-5 11 
6-10 0 
11-15 
16-20 
21-25 0 
26-30 
31+ 
17. How long ago was your last flight? 
18. Have you ever experienced an aircraft emergency situation? 
Yes El 
No 11 4 go to Q. 19 
If yes, what kind of emergency situation was 
it and what happened? 
19. How often do you carry out strenuous physical exercise? 
Once a day 
3+ times a week 
1-2 times a week 
1-2 times a month 
less than 1-2 times a month D 
20. If there are any further points you would like to make please use the space 
provided below: 
THANK-YOU 
Appendix N Type III exit briefing instruction options 
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Appendix 0 Experiment two raw evacuation times 
No M/F Condition Life jacket 
donning 
Handle to 
Exit Available 
Handle to wing "Open" to 
wing 
1 F card 1 48.52 9.65 19.47 25.31 
2 m card 1* 43.18 10.84 12.40 21.64 
3 m card 1* 44.06 9.04 11.16 17.90 
4 m card 1 38.12 10.52 12.96 16-92 
5 m card 1 49.00 6.00 9.00 10.28 
6 m card 3* 41.62 13.26 16.34 20.72 
7 m Video* 41.48 3.89 5.29 8.87 
8 F Video* 37.70 12.72 14.04 16.20 
9 F Video* 42.88 11.36 21.12 28.36 
10 F Video* 32.24 8.24 8.24 10.32 
11 m Video* 41.60 4.68 6.88 11.24 
12 m Video* 69.30 7.04 18.24 21.32 
13 m Verbal* 40.28 15.60 17.28 24.09 
14 m Verbal 42.05 4.56 6.20 7.92 
15 F Video* 67.57 9.40 12.20 16.76 
16 F Card 1* 29.60 9.66 11.22 13.22 
17 m Verbal* 52.23 7.08 9.52 17.04 
18 m Verbal* 34.92 9.56 11.36 19.92 
19 IM Nothing 46.52 9.70 13.70 20.72 
20 F Card 1* 49.39 17.50 23.04 28-96 
21 IM Nothing 39.44 4.26 6.52 11.60 
22 m Card 3 49.42 9.94 12.56 22.02 
23 m Card 3 61.60 5.88 7.28 12.28 
24 F Verbal* 50.56 9.12 13.76 18.20 
25 m card 2* 57.80 7.96 7.96 21-00 
26 m card 2* 39.08 5.04 8.28 10.08 
27 F Verbal* 50.24 12.48 15.56 18.36 
28 m Card 3 76.47 11.64 15.08 16.48 
29 F Verbal* 75.23 14.04 26.44 36-12 
30 F Card 1 62.66 13-91 18.83 20.83 
31 F Verbal 74.48 19.72 23.96 27.08 
32 F Nothing 44.80 23.13 25.24 30.48 
33 M Card 2* 45.56 7.26 9.18 12.80 
34 m Card 2 44.12 13.60 16.80 22.20 
35 F Card 2* 56.36 12.40 14.16 19.96 
36 F Card 3 48.52 14.48 24.88 27.12 
37 F Card 3 46.40 9.36 14.40 24.36 
38 F Card 2 58.40 10.72 14.88 23.87 
39 F Card 2 39.28 12.64 15.84 21.60 
40 F Card 2* 50.39 9.56 12.84 18.00 
41 F C iir-d -3 51.08 39.88 1 39.88 1 46.41 
42 F Card 3 39.36 7.28 9.56 12.24 
* Indicates that the exit was correcuy aisposeu ui uriLu Lrite wing 
No M/F Condition Life jacket 
donning 
Handle to 
Exit Available 
Handle to wing "Open" to 
wing 
43 m Nothing 46.24 5.82 8.86 9.60 
44 m Nothing 46.28 7.70 11.44 18.58 
45 F Nothing 54.36 9.14 12.28 20.43 
46 m Video 49.78 4.64 8.56 10.04 
47 m Card 4* 38.28 8.44 13.60 17.96 
48 F Nothing 55.56 16.16 19.72 25.28 
49 F Card 4* 41.84 17.68 19.84 28.68 
50 F Nothing 38.30 10.20 15.92 17.88 
51 m Card 4* 52.79 18.28 23.32 34.32 
52 F Card 4 72.26 6.8 12.92 28.4 
53 F Card 4* 56.88 13.14 16.64 23.32 
54 F Card 4 47.04 10.44 18.44 20.88 
55 m Card 4 46.29 9.26 12.96 15.33 
56 m Card 4* 51.23 10.56 12.99 16.43 
* Indicates that the exit was correctly disposed of onto the wing 
